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Criticized Uses of Federal Tax Exemption Privileges by Charitable
Foundations and Educational Institutions
President Truman's special tax message to Congress on January 23,
1950 contained a stinging denunciation of present loopholes in the in-
come tax statute,' and focused attention anew on schemes devised by
individuals and organizations to reduce or completely avoid the payment
of federal taxes on substantial incomes. Included in this excoriation
were certain activities of charitable and educational organizations which
have been accorded the exemption benefits of Sections 101(6) and
162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.2 The basic importance of these
organizations in our daily life makes it desirable to examine in detail the
nature of the activities criticized by the President and others; the probable
impact of such undertakings on society, if they are allowed to continue
in their present form; and remedies suggested to eliminate current and
probable future abuses.
It is the purpose of this Note to discuss these problems, after first
reviewing briefly, as background material, pertinent facts relating to
charitable and educational institutions in this country, and the liberal in-
terpretations by the courts of the relevant Code provisions. It should be
stressed that no condemnation is intended of any of the organizations
mentioned.
BACKGROUND
Charitable Foundations.-"The man who dies rich . . . dies dis-
graced," wrote Andrew Carnegies continuing, "a millionaire will be but
a trustee for the poor, intrusted for a season with a great part of the in-
creased wealth of the community." As a practical application of his
philosophy, Mr. Carnegie established eight foundations to which he do-
nated more than $200,000,000, 4 and thus gave great impetus to the slowly
developing movement in America for the establishment of philanthropic
foundations. 5 Consonant with this idea of contributing private wealth
1. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1950, p. 1, cols. 6, 8.
2. "Sec. 101. Exemptions from Tax on Corporation.
"The following organizations shall be exempt from taxation under this chap-
ter.. . .
"(6) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for . . . charitable, scientific . . . or educational purposes
* no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual ....
"Sec. 162. Net Income-Estates and Trusts.
"The net income of the estate or trust shall be computed in the same manner and
on the same basis as in the case of an individual, except that-
"(a) There shall be allowed a deduction . . . any part of the gross income,
without limitation, which pursuant to the terms of the will or deed creating the trust,
is during the taxable year paid or permanently set aside for the purposes specified...
or is to be used exclusively for . . . charitable . . . or educational purposes."
3. CARNEGIE, THE GosPEL OF WEALTH 18, 19 (1900).
4. Andrews, Foundations and Community Trusts, SocIAL WORK YEAR Boox 218
(1949).
5. KEPPEL, THE FOUNDATION 17 (1930). No more than seven foundations of any
importance carried over from the nineteenth century. COON, MONEY TO BURN 28
(1938).
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for public purposes, innumerable foundations have been established in
recent years; 6 the five largest and their estimated assets are: 7
Ford Foundation $205,000,000
Rockefeller Foundation 198,000,000
Carnegie Corporation of New York 171,000,000
Duke Endowment 135,000,000
Kresge Foundation 75,000,000
Additional stock assets will be distributed to the Ford Foundation upon
settlement of the estate of Henry Ford. Further, the eventual yields of
oil lands belonging to the new Cullen Foundation in Texas may place that
organization in this category.8
To encourage the altruistic and benevolent motives ostensibly behind
the establishment of this type of foundation, the income of such organiza-
tions has been consistently exempted from federal taxation.9 It is not
surprising, therefore, that a longing eye has been cast in the direction
of this type of enterprise by individuals and corporations in upper tax
brackets in an effort to evolve some plan whereby they could gain an ad-
vantage from this liberal tax provision. The astounding increase in the
number of these organizations in recent years 10 has created a suspicion
that "some taxpayers have strayed from the path of virtue in their search
for new tax avoidance devises." ii A disturbing number of these "foun-
dations" appear to have no headquarters other than the office of a law
firm, to be modest to the point of complete silence about any program for
social or public welfare, and to be making no present contributions from
their accumulated and accumulating wealth.'
2
Educational Institutions.-At the same time, colleges and universities,
faced with the anomalous situation of rapidly increasing costs, decreasing
income from endowments, and a decline in gifts by private donors, ap-
parently due to the impact of heavy, progressive taxation, found refuge
in the Supreme Court's ruling that the test of whether an organization
qualifies under Section 101(6) is the destination, not the source of its
income.' 3 Consequently, they have embarked on ventures which have
6. HARRISON AND ANDREWS, AmSERICAN FOUNDATIONS FOR SOCIAL WELFARE 22
(1946).
7. Andrews, New Challenges for our Foundations, The New York Times Maga-
zine, April 3, 1949, p. 16, col. 4.
8. Ibid.
9. Finkelstein, Freed&m from Uncertainty in Inconte Tax Exemptions, 48 MIcH.
L. REv. 449-50 (1950).
10. How To HAVE YoUR OwN FOUNDATION, Fortune, Aug. 1947, p. 109, col. 1.
11. Jenks, The Use and Misuse of Section 101(6), NEw YoRuc UNIVERSITY SEV-
ENTHi ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON TAXATION 1051 (1949) ; Note, 34 VA. L. REV. 182 n.8
(1948). Out of 166 questionnaires dispatched to foundations, principally of the
"family" variety, 103 made no replies and only 22 furnished extremely helpful in-
formation.
12. See ANDREWS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 219. Embree, Timid Billions, 198
HARPER's 28, 33 (March 1949) states that "many of the newer funds do not recognize
even a minimum of social responsibility. . .. ))
13. Trinidad v. Sagrada Ordin de. Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) (rental
income used to support legitimate activities of an exempt organization non-taxable).
Subsequently, an orphanage which operated competitive enterprises was allowed
to receive the benefits of Section 101(6). Sand Springs Home v. Commissioner, 6
B.T.A. 198, 217 (1927). It was recognized that for charities to be effective on a
broad scale, they must have large permanent endowments to provide necessary reve-
nue, and cannot depend on the philanthropic whims of individuals. More recently,
this philosophy was reaffirmed by the Tax Court in a holding that a ceramic founda-
tion was entitled to exemption, since its ultimate purpose was to promote the science
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evoked a sharp cry of criticism from attackers and an equally vociferous
defense by proponents. First, large investments have been made in rent-
producing real estate,' 4 and second, manufacturing and other business
enterprises have been purchased and operated in competition with private
businesses,' 5 the income from both of these activities being channeled into
the non-taxable coffers of the educational institutions.
It is the entrance into the field of these impecunious charities whose
trading position rests solely on their tax exemption, and the alleged abuse
of this privilege, which has prompted Congressional investigation, and un-
favorable comment from powerful and respected quarters.1
6
EXAMPLES OF CRITICIZED AcTIvITIEs OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Rent-Producing Real Estate.-An interesting example of an educa-
tional institution seeking shelter under the roof of tax exemption is the
case of Washington University in St. Louis. At the end of 1946, ap-
proximately one-third of a total endowment of nearly $22,000,000 was
invested in rent-producing real estate, including 51 business buildings in
St. Louis, 2 buildings in Kansas City* and a railroad freight station and
switching yard. The estimated income from these investments is $500,000
annually, no part of which is subject to Federal income taxation.1
7
There are numerous examples of recent sales of realty to educational
foundations and lease-backs of the properties to the original owner.
18
Typical of this type of activity is the purchase by Yale University of an
eight-story building and warehouse in Kansas City from Spiegel, Inc., a
Chicago mail order house, for $1,000,000. The property was immediately
leased back for a 100-year period.' 9 Yale also has two properties under
lease to F. W. Woolworth Co., one leased to 1990 at a rental of $450,000
or art of ceramics, although its income was derived from the manufacture and sale
of standard cones in competition with other producers, and substantial payments to
the widow of the donor were stipulated in the establishment of the foundation. Com-
missioner v. Orton, 173 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1949). The Bureau has filed a non-
acquiescence to the decision, but has not applied for certiorari. Finkelstein, supra
note 9, at 463 n.1. The entire rationale of the majority was attacked vigorously by
the five-judge minority, who reasoned that the emphasis in the will on the continued
operation of the business, the competitive nature of the operations, and the substantial
payments to the widow precluded the foundation from qualifying as an exempt or-
ganization.
In Home Oil Mill v. Willingham, 68 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ala. 1945), it was held
that the income of a competitive, commercial business, whose stock was held by a
charitable trust, was not subject to federal taxation, in spite of the requirement that
the testator's sister serve as chairman of the trust and receive an annual salary for life.
Also see Debs Memorial Radio Fund v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1945),
and Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938). In the former
case, the commercial enterprise was operated for an exempt purpose. In the latter
case, a business corporation was operated as a subsidiary of a tax-exempt institution.
A tax exemption was granted both of these organizations; although the Bureau non-
acquiesced in both cases, it did not apply for certiorari.
14. 5 RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TAXATION REPORTS, No. 5, 33-34 (1948).
15. Time, Nov. 14, 1949, p. 96, col. 3.
16. Hearing before Committee on Ways and Means on Proposed Revisions of the
Int. Rev. Code, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. V, pp. 3406-31, 3525-42 (1948); Fortune,
supra note 10, at 143-44.
17. Wall Street Journal, April 12, 1947, p. 1, col. 6.
18. For a general discussion of sale and lease-back operations see Carey, Cor-
porate Financing Through Sale and Leaseback of Property; Business, Tax, and Policy
Considerations, 62 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1948); Seale, What is New Regarding Sales to
Charities and Other Exempt Organizations, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY EIGHTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE oN TAXATION 930 (1950).
19. See note 17 supra.
per annum net; the other to 1975 at a net annual return of $125,000.
The properties were purchased for approximately $9,300,000, subject to
financing of $8,700,000.20 Recently, under the title "Moola for Boola,"
Time Magazine reported that Connecticut Boola, Inc., a wholly owned
subsidiary of Yale University, purchased Macy's new nine-story building
in San Francisco for $4,500,000, and promptly leased the store back to
Macy's for 31 years and two months, at an average annual rental of
$240,000. It thereby received a fairly sure tax-exempt income of 5.3%
on its investment. 2 ' Other department store buildings owned by Yale
are Frank and Sedar in Philadelphia, and, together with Cornell Uni-
versity, University of Rochester, Lawrenceville School and the Louis J.
and Mary E. Horowitz Foundation, Inc., the Philadelphia Gimbel's.
2 2
The University of Chicago receives on its Horder lease in Chicago
a return of 4% for the first 10 years, 4327% for the second 10 years, and
4y2 % for the last 10 years.28 Similarly, the University of Pennsylvania
has purchased- the department store building and lot owned by Lit
Brothers in Philadelphia for $3,000,000, and leased back the properties
for a 23-year period at an annual rental of $275,000 with an option to
renew the lease at expiration.2 4
In 1948 Columbia University reported an investment in Rockefeller
Center of over $28,000,000 and other real estate investments in excess
of $16,000,000. Annual rentals of approximately $3,750,000 and $960,000,
respectively, were received from these holdings.
2 5
One of the most publicized transactions of this nature was the pur-
chase in 1945 by Union College of Schenectady of essentially all of the
real estate of Allied Stores Corporation for approximately $16,500,000,
with a lease-back for 30 years and an option to renew for an additional
30-year period.
26
In all of these instances, advantages accrue to both the business firms
and the educational institutions.27  The latter are provided with a greater
return than could be received elsewhere, and because the income is tax-
exempt, the property owner probably receives a higher sale price and a
lower rental charge than could be obtained from a tax-paying owner.28
Furthermore, rental payments may be deducted as business expenses,29
a particularly advantageous procedure when the property sold has been
greatly depreciated on the seller's books, or is a non-depreciable asset,
i.e., land. Favorable rental terms have an additional advantage over
ownership in that they either result in a smaller debt structure or free
capital. In either case, more funds are available for merchandising uses,
and if indebtness is eliminated, the company's financial structure is simpli-
fied and refunding hazards are avoided.20 It was also pointed out to
20. Levy, The Trend of Corporations to Sell Their Real Estate to Institutional
Investors, Tnz MORTGAGE BANYER 2 (Dec. 1947).
21. Time, Nov. 14, 1949, p. 96, col. 3.
22. Wall Street Journal, Apr. 12, 1947, p. 2, col. 2.
23. Levy, supra note 20, at 2.
24. Wall Street Journal, Apr. 12, 1947, p. 2, col. 2.
25. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1948, p. 29, col. 4.
26. Levy, supra note 20, at 3, col. 3.
27. Hearings, supra note 16, at 3411. Levy, supra note 20, at 11 (Nov. 1947) sum-
marizes the reasons for these transactions given by corporate and institutional investors.
28. RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AmERIcA, WHAT'S YOUR BUSINESS REALLY WORTHE
3 (March 7, 1949). ,
29. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(a)-1; 6 REsEARcH INSTITUTE OF AmERICA,
TAXATION REmRT, No. 23, 177 (1949).
30. Levy, supra note 20, at 3, col. 3. In the Allied Stores Transaction, $8,000,000
of the sales price was used to pay pre-existing debts, resulting in a substantial im-
provement of the debt ratio.
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the stockholders of Allied Stores Corporation that in the sale of its
property to Union College, the corporation would suffer a loss for tax
purposes of approximately $340,000, deductible in determining federal
income and excess profits taxes, without any reduction in the excess
profits credit of the company or its subsidiaries. 31
Commercial Enterprises.-A far greater area of controversy, with
unlimited implications, has arisen where educational institutions have ac-
quired both the property and business of a going concern.3 2 The Ameri-
can Council of Education reports that 159 colleges and universities are
buying commercial enterprises out of endowment funds or with the tax-
exempt earnings of businesses they have taken over.
33
Undoubtedly, the most striking example of this practice has been the
activity by alumni and "friends" of New York University in forming
foundations to take over and operate manufacturing establishments for
the sole benefit of that institution. A separate foundation has been or-
ganized for each business, with different alumni participating; no com-
pensation is paid the directors, and on dissolution, all assets, after pay-
ment to creditors, must be paid to the university.3 4 Thus, in 1946 the
Ramsey Accessorites Corporation's assets of approximately $3,000,000
were sold to the Ramsey Corporation, a tax-exempt corporation-the
future profits to go to NYU's law and medical schools.3 5 By means of a
similar transaction in 1947, all earnings of the C. F. Mueller Company,
one of the largest producers of spaghetti products, became ear-marked
for the law school.3 6 Further purchases by "friends" of the university
of the $3,300,000 American Limoges China, Inc., and the $35,000,000
Howes Leather Co., will result in a diversion of the profits of those com-
panies to the university.37 It has been estimated that if these companies
were privately held, they would pay an estimated $1,500,000 yearly in
federal income taxes.
3 8
EXAMPLES OF CRITICIZED ACTIvtTIEs OF CHARITABLE FoUNDATIONS
Concurrently with the extension of activities by educational institu-
tions into controversial areas, private charitable foundations have been
used to satisfy less altruistic and perhaps selfish motives of donors, while
furthering social welfare.3 9 Former Secretary of Treasury Mellon used
this type of organization to eliminate all estate taxes on a multi-million
dollar estate.40  More recently, the Ford Foundation received upon the
deaths of Edsel and Henry Ford substantially all of the non-voting stock
of the Ford Motor Company, thereby becoming owner of over 90% of the
equity in one of the largest automobile companies in the United States.
4'
The remaining stock (voting) was left to the Ford family, who thus re-
tained full and undisputed control of the Company by combining this
31. Id. at 4, col. 3.
32. Hearings, supra note 16, at 3535.
33. Time, Nov. 14, 1949, p. 96, col. 3.
34. Hearings, supra note 16, at 3537.
35. Wall Street Journal, March 21, 1946, p. 1, col. 5.
36. Business Week, Oct. 18, 1947, p. 89, col. 1.
37. Time, Nov. 14, 1949, p. 98, col. 2.
38. Hearings, supra note 16, at 3540.
39. LASSER, How TAX LAWS IMAKE GIVING TO CHARITY EASY 56 (1948).
40. RESEARCH INsTITUTE OF AMERICA, FAMILY TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE 1948
REVENUE AcT 12 (1948).
41. How to Have Your Own Foundation, Fortune, Aug. 1947, p. 108, col. 2.
ownership with their control of the Foundation.4 2  Furthermore, the re-
sulting reduction in the taxable estates of Edsel and Henry Ford made
it unnecessary to dispose of the stock publicly to meet huge estate taxes.
43
Many less wealthy individuals have found it advantageous to use
charitable foundations to retain family control of enterprises, to reduce
taxable estates, to avoid forced liquidations, 44 and to serve as a buffer
between a living donor and activities soliciting funds.45 Contributions up
to the maximum amount deductible for tax purposes may be made by the
donor, but ultimate distributions may be delayed at the discretion of the
trustees 4Q-generally, the donor and members of his family. In the mean-
time, payments may be made to the trustees, their friends, or relatives,
for services rendered.
4 7
Donors may provide additional benefits to their families by leaving
the principal of their estate to a charitable foundation with a proviso that
the income be paid to their survivors for life. The present value of the
estate will thus be considered exempt from federal estate taxes, resulting
in a lower tax due, a correspondingly larger principal fund from which
the survivors will receive income, and an ultimate benefit to the founda-
tion.
48
Corporations have found it advantageous to establish non-profit or-
ganizations which, while exempt from federal taxation, would cater to
localized corporate interests. A typical example is the Altman Founda-
tion which "promotes the social, physical or economic welfare and effi-
ciency of the employees of B. Altman and Co." 4' The Richman Founda-
tion loans money without interest to solvent employees of Richman Bros.,
42. N.Y. Times, April 19, 1947, p. 1, col. 4; N.Y. Times, June 4, 1943, p. 23,
col. 6.
43. RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, Op. Cit. .supra note 40.
44. Ibid; Eaton, Charitable Trusts in Business, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 615 (Oct.
1949).
A typical example of how a less wealthy individual may use a charitable founda-
tion to advantage is as follows:
Z, a married man, owns 1,000 shares of stock (controlling interest) of a
corporation. The stock cost him $20,000 and is worth $200,000. X receives a
salary of $25,000 a year and 50% of the corporate profit of $18,000 is usually paid
out as a dividend. If each year X contributes 25 shares of stock worth $5,000
to the foundation he will-
(1) Save $2,026 in income tax since the $5,000 is deductible as a charitable
contribution. The dividend loss will only be $225 ($9 per share on 25 shares)
and the appreciation in value of the stock is not subject to tax.
(2) If X died after 10 years, his estate tax would be cut about $15,000 due
to the contributions of $50,000; and control of the business would remain with X's
family." 6 RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TAXATION REPORT, No. 5 (1949).
For a method by which charitable foundations may be used to convert normal
income into a capital gain, see 6 RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TAXATION REPORT,
No. 12, 93 (1949).
45. Fortune, supra. note 41, at 143, col. 1.
46. William T. Bruckner v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 419 (1930) (to build old
people's home, income accumulated for sixteen years at time of hearing).
47. Jenks, supra note 11, at 1059-60. In Home Oil Mill v. Willingham, 68 F.
Supp. 525 (N.D. Ala. 1945), the charitable foundation was required to pay the
testator's sister an annual salary of $15,000 a year for life for acting as chairman
of the trust, which was to be liquidated one year after her death.
48. INT. REv. CoDE §§812(d), 1004(a) (2) (B). The estate tax is computed on
the actuarial value of the life estate. Rockefeller, Fornnuid and Table for Comptlng
Estate Taxes With Charitable Residuary, 86 JouR. OF Accr. 458 (1948). However, if
the non-exempt payments are large in relation to the assets or income of the founda-
tion, the exemption will be denied. Scholarship Endowment Fund v. Nicholas, 106
F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1939).
49. Fortune, supra note 41, at 143, col. 1.
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a men's clothing firm, and also finances sick and maternity leaves of com-
pany employees.50 Free research service is also received from tax-exempt
foundations endowed by corporations.51
All of the stock of the Calloway Mills Company is owned by the
Calloway Mills Foundation, a charitable corporation.52  The Company
also leases certain cotton mills from the Foundation. Undoubtedly, the
latter's expenditures tend to conform to interests of the corporation.
The Hershey Industrial School owns the majority stock in the Hershey
Chocolate Corporation, and in turn, is controlled by that company. Over
a period of years, the corporation invested $30,000,000 of the School's
tax free funds in an attempt to establish a sugar empire in Cuba to supply
the Chocolate Company's requirements for sweetening. Losses from the
ventures were borne by the Industrial School, and thus did not affect the
Company's profits. Conversely, any profits that might have been made
would have been tax-free and available to the corporation to expand its
activities.53
The Textron Trusts.-Perhaps the most striking example so far re-
vealed of charitable organizations being used primarily for the advantage
of a commercial enterprise is the close cooperation which has existed be-
tween Textron, Inc., and the various trusts created or inspired by Mr.
Royal Little, its president. In the space of a few years, financial ma-
neuverings between the trustees and Textron caused organizations with
original contributions of $1,100 to increase to a net worth of over
$6,000,000." 4 The Rhode Island Charities Trust, the Rayon Foundation,
and the M. I. T. Trust were formed with contributions of $500, $100, and
$500 respectively, and their security holdings were originally purchased
from an investment company in which Mr. Little was interested, the sole
consideration being unsecured promissory notes. Earnings of the Rhode
Island Charities Trust, from its inception in 1937 to September 1945,
totaled $500,000, and from the latter date to September 1948, $4,000,000.
Disbursements to its sole beneficiary, the Providence, R. I. Community
Chest aggregated $85,000 (none prior to 1945), while the trustees and
bank handling the securities received in excess of $140,000. The Rayon
Foundation, organized in 1944, made a profit of $750,000 in the four-and-
a-quarter years ended October 1948. Payments of $75,000 were made
to its beneficiary, the Rhode Island School of Design. The M. I. T. Trust
was formed in 1937, and its net earnings to October 1948 was approxi-
mately $1,000,000. No payments were made to its beneficiary, the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology. At October 1948, no income taxes had
been paid by any of these trusts; r5 their books had not been audited, and
no accounting had been rendered the beneficiaries.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Hearings, upra note 16, at 3560.
53. Business Week, Sep. 13, 1947, p. 22, col. 3.
54. Unless specifically noted to the contrary, all information hereafter listed re-
lating to the operations of the Rhode Island Charities Trust, the Rayon Foundation
and the M.I.T. Trust is taken from SEN. REP. No. 101, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949),
hereinafter cited as REPoRT.
55. Id. at 20, 21. In September 1947, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
notified the trustees of these trusts that in view of the nature of their operations, they
were not exempt under any provisions of the income tax law. Accordingly, they
were requested to file income tax returns. The trusts claimed an exemption under
Sec. 162(a); no returns were filed, and eighteen months after the Bureau's ruling,
no action had been taken to enforce payment of the claims. The Treasury Depart-
ment apparently has acknowledged that such trusts are exempt under the present law,
The indentures governing these trusts allow the trustees discretion
far beyond that normally found in a trust agreement. For example, power
was given the trustees to purchase unproductive property; to purchase
securities on margin and to sell securities short; to promote the organiza-
tion and expansion of business enterprises, to underwrite securities, and
become a member of underwriting syndicates; to sell trust property to
themselves or organizations in which they were interested; and to loan
funds to themselves. Further, the trustees were allowed to hold the prop-
erty of the trust in the name of any individual or corporation, without
indicating that it was trust property; exceptionally broad powers were
given them to endorse notes without personal liability; and they were to
receive reasonable compensation, not to exceed 5% of the trust principal
or 6% of the gross income of the trust for any year, whichever is larger.
For the purpose of determining the principal, no deduction was to be
made of trust indebtedness. Thus a premium was placed on accumulating
trust assets, rather than distributing them to the beneficiaries. Trustees
were relieved from personal liability for losses incurred, regardless of the
speculative nature or lack of diversification of the investments; no bonds
were required nor was there a requirement for an accounting to the
beneficiaries or audit.
Since Mr. Little was the motivating force behind their formation,
and because of the unhampered powers granted the trustees, it is not
surprising that the trusts operated primarily for the benefit of Textron
and its affiliates. The non-taxable nature of their income furnished the
trusts with a substantial competitive advantage over banks and other
lending agencies, of which full use was made. In 1944, the Rhode Island,
Rayon, and M. I. T. Trusts purchased $3,000,000 worth of Textron
Southern Class A stock, three-quarters of the entire issue. The dividend
rate on this issue was 10 percent and the call price double the issue price
of $10 per share: In 1947, one-half of this stock held by the trusts was
exchanged for 5% preferred stock and common stock, representing one-
half of the Class A stock redemption value. In the following year, an
exchange of the remaining one-half was made for cash and 4 5's deben-
tures, representing three-quarters of the redemption value. It is axiomatic
that Textron received a definite advantage in substituting preferred stock
with a 5% rate and common stock without a fixed rate for 10% stock.
It also goes without saying that additional benefits were received in that
it would no longer have to redeem the stock at double its issuance price.
Further assistance was given Textron by the trusts in the purchase
of certain assets of Textron and its subsidiaries. For example, the Rhode
Island Trust purchased for $1,200,000 in 1945 a mill owned by one of
Textron's subsidiaries, immediately leased back the property, and thus
without interrupting operations supplied Textron with additional working
capital. In 1943, the M. I. T. Trust purchased from Textron $200,000
worth of machinery and immediately leased it back to the company.
Similar purchases and lease-backs of $147,000 worth of equipment were
made in 1944. In summary, during most of 1946 approximately
$4,000,000, or virtually two-thirds of the total assets of the three trusts,
were invested in securities and assets of Textron. During this period of
heavy expansion, Textron's credit was strained to the limit. It is prob-
lematical that such an extensive undertaking could have been successful
in view of recent recommendations by Secretary of Treasury Snyder that legislation
be enacted to correct this type of abuse. See Treasury Department, Statenent by
Secretary Snvder before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representa-
tives, Feb. 3, 1950, p. 16.
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without this ever-present source of both credit and purchasers of securities
and property.
In 1944, Textron desired to purchase the Lonsdale Company but was
precluded from doing so because of its strained financial position. There-
fore the Rhode Island Trust, of which Mr. Little was trustee, borrowed
$4,500,000 and with this loan, together with notes to the stockholders of
Lonsdale of $2,500,000, purchased all of the Lonsdale stock for $7,000,000.
During the succeeding year, the trust had declared to itself a total of
$5,774,000 in dividends; sold part of the property to the Rayon Trust;
and then sold its stockholdings in Lonsdale to Textron for $1,654,000.
Thus, a profit of approximately $500,000 was realized in less than a year.
In the succeeding 2 years and 8 months, Lonsdale's earnings were almost
three times the price that Textron paid for the stock. The trustees
justified the sale on the basis of "considerable uncertainty regarding post-
war earnings in the textile industry." Surrounding circumstances, how-
ever, apparently did not justify such a conclusion. The properties pur-
chased by the Rayon Trust were leased to Lonsdale and in less than two
years approximately two-thirds of the purchase price was recovered. The
mills were then sold to the Sixty Trust, a trust for the benefit of Textron
executives, and the lease providing for rental payments by Textron on
the basis of sales was renegotiated to provide for a flat rental of $102,000
per year. This was one-third of the minimum rental originally provided
for, and one-sixth of the amount that the Rayon Trust received during
its first year of ownership.
A strikingly similar example of such cooperation occurred in regard
to the purchase by Textron of the Manville-Jenckes Corporation, and the
subsequent re-sale of a substantial part of the property to the Rhode
Island Trust. The latter trust, in turn, sold to the Sixty Trust, which
renegotiated Textron's leases downward, and then sold to an outside
interest at a profit of $600,000.
By skillful use of federal tax laws, therefore, three trusts were able
to expand from minute organizations into going concerns of substantial
means. Their procedure was to obtain controlling interests in corpora-
tions; to cause the corporate assets to be converted into cash; and then
to distribute the cash to themselves as non-taxable dividends. The funds
received were automatically available for the purchase of Textron's securi-
ties or physical assets. In defense of their operations, Mr. Little stated
that the basic philosophy was to accumulate additional assets for the bene-
ficiaries.56 He did not discuss the possibility, however, that the wide dis-
cretion accorded the trustees might result in a substantial depletion of the
accumulated assets.57 For example, the Treasury Department found that
stock was sold to friends and associates of the trustees at less than either
cost or real value.58
ABUSES AND REMEDIES
Educational Institutions.-Great stress has been placed by competent
observers on the possible undue concentration of economic power in edu-
cational institutions, if their policy of purchasing income-producing prop-
erty and commercial establishments continues.5 Flowing from this un-
desirable result would be increased agitation for greater controls by gov-
ernmental agencies, and a possible sacrifice of the independence of the
colleqes. Emphasis has also been placed on the loss of tax revenue from
56. Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 11, 1950, p. 6, col. 7.
57. REPORT, supra note 54, at 9.
58. REPORT, supra note 54, at 21.
59. Hearivgs, supra note 16, at 3528.
these sources, which will have to be shouldered by other groups,60 and
the competition with private business.0 1 A further criticism has been
that these institutions generally pay state and local taxes on their business
profits and property, while claiming federal exemption.
62
Proponents of the present policy of colleges and universities contend
that such objections are more fictitious than real. 3  They argue that the
possible dangers have not sufficiently crystallized to justify a reversal of
judicial thinking or Congressional policy. From their viewpoint, the
social responsibility now borne by the educational institutions justifies
the present liberal exemptions which, they claim, involves only a com-
paratively small loss of revenue to the federal government. Tax pay-
ments to non-federal authorities are defended on grounds of the minor
amounts involved, the restricted tax basis available to those authorities,
and other local considerations.
Obviously, the alternatives which would be created by a decrease in
the exemptions allowed are a reduction in the activities of the colleges, an
increase in student fees, or a demand on public authorities for additional
funds, accompanied by inherent dangers of greater control and regulation
by the appropriating agencies. The final decision in such matters must
necessarily depend upon the relative weight given each of these arguments.
President Stassen of the University of Pennsylvania recently discussed
these matters as a problem of ethics, and warned that the trend is danger-
ous.0 4  He particularly opposed income tax exemption for commercial
activities, unless the primary purpose is to serve students, faculty, and
guests, and unless at least half of the business is conducted with them.6 5
President Truman's current tax message, while generally approving a
federal policy of encouraging educational institutions through tax exemp-
tions, criticized the extension of this exemption to income from private
business enterprises."
Thus, both of these distinguished gentlemen approve the distinction
between "investment activities" and "trade or business" as the test for
applying the exemption privilege. Although it may be that such a line
of demarcation is the easiest one to draw, it rests on extremely tenuous
grounds. For example, Junto, a non-profit adult school in Philadelphia,
recently acquired title to 4,000 homes in a real estate deal involving more
than $30,000,000.67 The immediate profits, estimated to be about $75,000
yearly, after payment of mortgage costs, interest fees and operational
charges, will be used to expand the school's Philadelphia facilities and to
branch out into other cities.68 In a determination as to whether this is
an "investment" or "trade or business," strong arguments can be ad-
60. Id. at 3529.
61. Id. at 3526, 3534; N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1950, p. 1, col. 6.
62. Hearings, supra note 16, at 3531. Not all educational institutions pay city
taxes. It is estimated that the loss to the city of St. Louis due to the non-payment of
property taxes by Washington University approximates $220,000 annually. As a
result, that institution has agreed to greatly curtail future real estate investments
within the city. Wall Street Journal, Apr. 12, 1947, p. 1, col. 6.
63. Hearings, supra note 16, at 3525-42 (statement by John Gerdes on behalf of
New York University).
64. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Jan. 13, 1950, p. 20, col. 1.
65. Office of the President, University of Pennsylvania, Memorandum Covering
the Principal Extemporaneous Remarks of Harold E. Stassen . . . Chairman of the
Committee on Taxation and Industry of the Association of American. Colleges . . .
(1950).
66. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1950, p. 1, col. 8.
67. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Feb. 24, 1950, p. 1, col. 5.
68. Id. at p. 3, col. 8.
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vanced on both sides. Furthermore, activities in both of these categories
are competitive with tax-paying activities; they deprive the federal gov-
ernment of revenue; and they tend to concentrate capital in the hands
of tax-exempt entities. Logically, therefore, they should be treated alike.
A solution frequently offered is to require tax-exempt corporations
to distribute to the educational institution a portion of its profits at least
equal to the amount of tax it would have paid if it were not exempt. 9
This would equate the position of tax-paying and tax-exempt commercial
activities as to their ability to accumulate income, except for the moral
obligation of the former to make dividend distributions to stockholders and
legal restrictions on the improper accumulation of surplus.70 However, the
unsolved problem would still remain as to the effect of and justification
for the loss of governmental revenue.
A recent statement by the Treasury Department noted that exempt
institutions are able to trade on their exemption by purchasing rent-
producing property with borrowed funds.71 The tax-free earnings may
be used to repay the loans and to make additional investments in property.
To meet this situation, it was recommended that the rents should be taxed
in the proportion that the unpaid indebtedness on the property bears to
the total purchase price. It is submitted that allowing an exemption to
colleges which purchase property with funds in their treasury, while deny-
ing it to those which must borrow funds, gives the former an undue ad-
vantage. Traditionally, the income of educational institutions considered
tax-exempt consisted of gifts, student fees, and receipts from the invest-
ment of their funds. From that viewpoint, the Treasury's position is
understandable. Changing circumstances, however, in the nature of in-
creasing costs and decreasing endowment income, have placed many col-
leges in a precarious financial condition, 72 so that an expansion of the
present concept appears justified. Earnings from borrowed funds should
be considered on a par with those of institutional funds for tax purposes.
Charitable Foundations.-The growth of charitable foundations has
emphasized, in a novel manner, the economic concept of control of prop-
erty without ownership. Recognized as early as a century and a half
ago as a concomitant of corporate enterprise organized for private profit,73
this control is today the primary motivating force in the establishment
of many of these foundations. 74
Courts and legislators early recognized that restraints on the alien-
ation or use of property were adverse to the community interest,75 and
placed restrictions thereon which have operated within their limited sphere.
But the law has failed to keep pace with the changing economic concept
of property: there are neither restrictions on the amount of wealth that
one may control, nor is there a time limit on such control. Consequently,
in 1910 J. P. Morgan obtained the power to direct the investment of over
$500,000,000 by purchasing 51% of a $100,000 par capital stock issue of
the Equitable Life Assurance Company for $3,000,00.76 Today, organiza-
69. Hearings, supra note 16, at 3527.
70. INT. REV. CODE § 102.
71. Supplementary Treasury Department Statement on Tax Exempt Organizations
(1950 Revenue Bill) Before House Ways and Means Committee, Feb. 6, 1950, p. 2.
72. See note 65 supra; Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 20, 1950, p. 12, col. 2.
73. ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONs, Bk V, c. 1, pt. II, art. 1 (1776).
74. LASSER, op. cit. supra note 39.
75. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 3251 (Purdon 1930).
76. Report of the Pujo Committee, H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess.
83-85, 135 (1913).
tions similar to the Ford Foundation enable a comparatively few indi-
viduals to control increasing wealth. 77  The exemption allowed for gifts
to charitable institutions has made possible the circumvention of one of
the basic philosophies behind the federal estate tax law, i. e., the return
to public use of accumulated fortunes for subsequent channeling into the
economy unfettered by restrictions. 78 Foundations, by protecting capital
from the corrosive effect of high taxation, appear to be the last method
available for one to divert substantial sums to sources of his own choosing,
in view of the present day income and estate taxes.
79
In his last tax message President Truman recommended that tax
exemption be denied when charitable foundations are "used as a cloak
for business ventures." 80 Subsequently, the Treasury Department recom-
mended that such organizations be required to pay out all net income
within a specified period after the close of a taxable year, with a proviso
that reasonable amounts might be retained to provide for contingencies.
Further, accumulations for extraordinary purposes could be placed in
escrow for a limited period. It was also recommended that severe re-
strictions be placed on transactions between a foundation and its donor,
his family or corporations controlled by him.8 '
These suggestions are obviously directed at remedying the immediate
abuses currently available to promoters of charitable institutions who seek
a personal advantage. If enacted, their effect should be salutary. They
fail, however, to meet the broader problem of the economic effect of bring-
ing great amounts of wealth under the control of eleemosynary institu-
tions,8 2 and the related issue of indefinite control of that capital by a select
few or their self-appointed successors. 83  Cognizance should also be given
to the effect of trustees being bound by the directions and desires of a
donor.8 4 Large blocks of capital may thereby be rendered sterile,8 5 and
funds disbursed will tend to flow into avenues reflecting only the founder's
wishes.86
77. N.Y. Times, April 19, 1947, p. 1, col. 4; N.Y. Times, June 4, 1943, p. 23, col. 6.
78. RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AmERICA, op. cit. supra note 40.
79. See LASSER, op. cit. supra note 39.
80. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1950, p. 1, col. 8.
81. See note 71 supra. For additional recommendations, see 6 RESEARCH INSTI-
TUTE OF AmERICA, TAXATION REPORT, No. 5, 36 (1949).
82. To prevent the concentration of business in charitable organizations, the
Canadian Government recently introduced a bill providing that no foundation could
own more than 10% of the capital stock of any company. 6 REsEARCH INSTITUTE OF
AMERICA, TAXATION REPORT, No. 12, 93 (1949). 1
83. For severe criticism of the powers exercised by the Duke Endowment, and
replies, see Seeman, Duke but not Doris, 88 Niw REPUBLIC 220 (1936); Cavers,
Fuller, and Maggs, The Duke University Law School it Rebuttal, 88 NEw REPUBLIC
311 (1936) ; Seeman, In Rebuttal, 89 NEw REPUBLIC 48 (1936) ; and Cavers, More
About Duke, 89 NEw REPUBLIC 114 (1936).
84. Several years ago, 55 foundation board members were questioned. 30, includ-
ing 10 who said so emphatically, believed in strict adherence to the founder's wishes in
administration of the foundation; 11 were undecided; and 14 did not believe in such
adherence, 7 of them strongly. COFFMAN, AmEmCAN FOUNDATIONS 166, 167, 169
(1936).
85. Fortune, supra note 41, at 143, col. 2. Many foundations outlive their use-
fulness, e.g., a fund was left a Boston hospital to provide wooden legs for Civil War
Veterans; $2,000,000 was left to care for daughters of railroad workers killed on
the Pennsylvania Railroad; and real estate in downtown Manhattan, left in 1801 to
endow "Sailors Snug Harbor," a home for "aged, decrepit, and worn out sailors," is
now assessed at over $8,700,000, with rental income running into seven figures annually.
Relatively few seamen are benefited.
86. Apparently it was not a coincidence that a study of industrial conditions was
begun by the Rockefeller Foundation at the time of the Ludlow Mining Strike, which
involved a mine in which Rockefeller was himself financially interested. 9 SEN. Doc.
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It should also be recognized that, in recent years, our charitable or-
ganizations have failed to reflect the imagination and resourcefulness that
so vividly characterized their early existence.8 7 Rockefeller's millions
played an imposing role in transforming our medical and public health
facilities from mediocrity to world leadership. Funds from that source
were also largely responsible for the control and elimination of hookworm,
malaria and yellow fever. Credit must also be given it for the develop-
ment of the University of Chicago and the resulting stimulating effect
on progressive education throughout the country. The Carnegie Founda-
tion took the initiative in providing public libraries in hundreds of towns
and cities. The Julius Rosenwald Fund made substantial contributions
toward equalizing educational opportunities for all the people in America.
The Russell Sage Foundation was instrumental in replacing cumbersome
trial and error approaches with scientific methods in social work. The
passage of time, however, aided by the depression of the thirties, has
allowed conservatism to make serious inroads. It is asserted that there
is no longer a trend for them to make daring investments; now many
trustees appear preoccupied with perpetuating and enlarging their roles.,8
Consequently, many investments are spread too thinly to produce lasting
results; security is frequently the chief criterion in determining invest-
ments; and reserves are often created to protect capital.
To combat these disturbing trends and possibilities, consideration
should be given to the advisability of denying tax exemption benefits to
such organizations unless their duration is limited; 89 a proper accounting
is made to the public; the public is represented on the board of trustees;
and the trustees have power to vary the original directions of the donor,
if warranted by changing circumstances. 90 The imposition of such con-
ditions would negative criticism that the "dead hand" of wealth dominates
our economy, and a higher degree of social vision might be mirrored in
future expenditures. It should be recognized, however, that if the lives
of such foundations are restricted, we must face the problem of their
eventual disappearance. The effect of present tax laws on the accumula-
tion of capital makes it improbable that the establishment of new founda-
tions will keep pace with the forced termination of existing ones. Mr.
Julius Rosenwald's belief that endowments should be completely ex-
pended within a short period of time, because future generations could
No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 8383 (1916). Large foundations generally vote their
stock in the interest of the founder's family. BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN COR-
PORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 82-3 (1932).
87. Embree, Timid Billions, 198 HAPER's 28-32 (March 1949) describes the work
of famous older philanthropists.
88. Ibid.
89. A provision of the Julius Rosenwald Fund required its liquidation within
twenty-five years after the death of the donor. EMBREE, JULIUs ROsENwALD FUND-
REVIEW OF Two DECADES 3 (1936). Contrast this with a provision of the Duke
Endowment directing that one-fifth of the annual income be set aside and allowed
to accumulate until it equaled the original principal. Fortune, supra note 41, at 109,
col. 2.
90. Community trusts, which are generally organized to consolidate the operations
of numerous smaller trusts into an efficient operating medium for public benefit, are
controlled by trustees who are representative of the community as a whole. If a
donor's directions become "unnecessary, impracticable, or impossible," the trustees may
alter them. Apparently the results of such operations have proven very satisfactory
and would justify the imposition of these conditions on large, private foundations.
LASSER, op. cit. supra note 39, at 60-61; Andrews, Foundations and Community Trusts,
SOCIAL WORK YEAR Boorc 218, 221 (1949).
provide for their own needs,91 must be viewed in the light of recent tax
developments.
CONCLUSION
We have a large stake in the existence of strong, independent edu-
cational and charitable institutions. On the whole, their records are good
and they are serving well.9 2 Educational institutions have assumed the
tremendous responsibility of training citizens to meet the harsh require-
ments of daily living. Charitable organizations stand alone in making
giving a science. If unhampered by political controls, they are still capable
of spear-heading experiment and new movements and of stepping aside
when success is assured so as to concentrate their accumulated skills and
resources on new ventures.
Many new frontiers are waiting to be tapped. The appalling lag in
the social sciences, and the apparent inability of men throughout the world
to locate a common basis of agreement, provide fields of exploration with
unlimited possibilities. Some progress has already been made in that
direction by charitable foundations. 93 The frightening potentialities of
the atom bomb and the "H-bomb," increase the urgency for more ag-
gressive efforts on a wider front. For foundations precluded from under-
taking such ambitious programs, local and regional problems present
sufficient challenges to stir the imagination. Racial and religious preju-
dices must be eliminated; management-labor relations should be clarified;
properly timed transfusions of new capital into social, recreational, and
health programs will produce effective results.
Delimitation of the present tax exemptions should be preceded by a
full consideration of the broad social and economic problems involved.
Tax laws should not be considered as mere vehicles for the collection of
revenue. Prejudices should not be held against foundations simply be-
cause they are family or industrially controlled. The criterion for deter-
mining whether an organization qualifies for tax exemption privileges
should be the public service rendered by it. This is not a matter for the
courts; corrective measures should be preceded by a definitive legislative
investigation. The current and past hearings of various committees of
the House of Representatives,9" studies by the Treasury Department,95
and other published data on the subject 9 6 provide a broad base of informa-
tion which should be used to formulate positive Congressional action.
D.K.
91. EMBREE, op. cit. stpqra note 89.
92. Andrews, New Challenges for Our Foundations, The New York Times
Magazine, April 3, 1949, p. 53, col. 2.
93. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1950, p. 17, col. 8. The Rockefeller Foundation granted
$100,000 to begin an investigation to define the ethical side of economic actions in
modem society. Harvard University was recently granted $740,000 toward support
of a Russian Research Center to study all phases of Russian life. See Andrews,
mpra note 92 at 54, col. 5.
94. See Hearings, supra note 16. Additional hearings are being conducted at the
present time relative to the problem of tax exemptions.
95. See note 71 vtpra. In 1942 the Treasury Department recommended to Con-
gress that all income derived by charities from a trade or business not necessarily
incident to their exempt activities be taxed. Blodgett, Taxation of Business Conducted
by Charitable Organizations, NEw YoRK UN p;;srrY FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
FEDERAL TAXATION 418, 419 n.2 (1946).
96. For a summary of writings on the general subject of charitable foundations,
not referred to in this note, see Andrews, Foundations and Community Trusts, SocrAL
WORK YEAR BOOK 218, 222-23 (1949).
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Restrictions on Admission to the Bar: By-Product of Federalism
Andrew Jackson envisaged a freely democratic legal profession in
which every individual had an inherent right to be admitted to the bar.
Historically, however, admission has been considered a privilege to be
conferred only upon the competent,' and not a constitutionally protected
right.2  The lawyer, as an officer of the court, serves the public as well as
his client, and public interest in the high calibre of legal service is para-
mount to any assumed right of the individual.3 In England exclusion of
the unfit was declared by statute in 1402 4 to be an inherent power of the
judiciary, necessary to its protection.5  In the United States, courts'
plenary powers 6 are derived from the constitution since the purpose in
separating governmental functions would be defeated if the officers of one
branch were allowed control over another. 7 Consequently the legislature
may not establish standards which would make admission mandatory,8
although some jurisdictions permit legislative prescription of minimum
standards as a valid exercise of the police power.9  Furthermore, the
judiciary effectively controls admission to the bar since it adjudicates the
constitutionality of all rules, whether promulgated by the courts or by
the legislature.' 0  While high standards can only be achieved through
exacting academic and moral requirements, the reason for barriers does
not extend to rules predicated on special privilege and designed to reduce
competition as an end in itself." Democratic principles dictate that any
barrier imposed should pertain solely to an individual's ability to render
adequate service.' While the bar, in the exercise of its inherent power,
is resp6nsible for improving standards in the legal profession, it is also
in a position to exclude applicants discriminatorily. An examination of
the requirements for admission reveals many rules which are unrelated
1. State v. Dudley, 340 Mo. 852, 102 S.W.2d 895 (1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
693 (1937). McCracken, Character Examination in Pennsylvania, 25 A.B.A.J. 873
(1939).
2. See In re Cate, 273 Pac. 617, 619 (Cal. 1928) ; In re Cloud, 217 Iowa 3, 10,
250 N.W. 160, 163 (1933).
3. See Booth v. Fletcher, 101 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1938). Paper by Karl Mc-
Cormick, 61 REP. N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 82, 84 (1938).
4. 1402, 4 HENRY IV, C. 18.
5. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 609, 180 N.E. 725, 727 (1932),
for a similar rationale of the rule in the United States.
6. For the view that the judiciary has power to impose any pre-requisite which
it sees fit to incorporate into the local rules of court, see Smyth's Application, 40
D. & C. 98 (Pa. C.P., Monroe Co. 1940).
7. Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52 (1926). The judicial power extends to the selec-
tion of the courts' janitor. It re janitor Sup. Ct., 35 Wis. 410 (1874).
8. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882); In re Day, 181 Il1. 73, 54 N.E. 646
(1899) ; In re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N.E. 725 (1932). Contra:
In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (1860).
9. Ex parte Galusha, 184 Cal. 697, 195 Pac. 406 (1921) ; Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal.
241 (1864) ; Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293 (1863) ; In re Application for License,
143 N.C. 1, 55 S.E. 635 (1906).
10. Carver v. Clephane, 137 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Laughlin v. Clephane,
77 F. Supp. 103 (D. C. 1947).
11. The rules are for the protection of the public interest, not for the advance-
ment of the individual. See it re Opinion of the justices, 289 Mass. 607, 612, 194
N.E. 313, 317 (1935) ; People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 339, 125 N.E. 671, 673 (1919).
12. See United States v. American Medical Association, 130 F.2d 233, 246 (D.C.
Cir. 1942). The place where a physician has resided and practiced cannot furnish
a basis for classification; it is arbitrary and void. State v. Pennoyer, 65 N.H. 113,
18 Atl. 878 (1889).
to educational or moral qualifications.13 Such restraints in practical effect
serve to protect local interests and are not justified from a public and
professional standpoint. These restraints affect law students seeking ad-
mission to the profession and attorneys who wish to move to another
jurisdiction.
STUDENT APPLICANTS
Residence and Registration.-The main hurdles which face students
are registration 14 and residence 1 requirements. Both of these pre-
requisites ostensibly are directed toward the elimination of the morally
unfit applicant. It is argued, in defense of residence requirements, that
the public and the state bar association are given an opportunity to become
familiar with the applicant's moral character.' 6 The thesis would appear
to be valid only in a state of small communities in which neighbors are
in close contact with the individual and, consequently, able to make an
intelligent, unbiased evaluation of his character. This is seldom the case.
In the metropolitan districts it is extremely difficult to obtain information
unless it is volunteered or obtainable from law enforcement agencies.
17
Actually, residence is predominantly a question of intent,'8 and may be
satisfied by a declaration of intent to become a resident, a mailing address,
and intermittent visits to the state. In such a case, the element of per-
sonal contact evaporates and a premium is placed on being far-sighted
rather than on having good moral character. This barrier would be sub-
ject to less criticism if admissions committees made a real effort to secure
information from the applicant's associates; 1 most committees, however,
content themselves with affidavits of good character,20 and since the refer-
ences are selected by the applicant, the writers are likely to feel a greater
responsibility to him than to the legal profession.21 Mere residence, then,
does not provide real knowledge of the candidate. Indeed, the applicant's
former residence is a more fertile source of information, and references
from that area would be predicated on a fuller knowledge of the candidate.
13. "In several states the barriers against outlanders have been so raised as to
make one wonder whether the motive was purely one of protecting the public against
unfitness." Garrison, The Problem of Overcrowding, 16 TENN. L. Rzv. 658, 675
(1941).
14. Detailed information concerning each state may be found in RuLEs FoR AD-
MISSION TO THE BAR (West Publ. Co., 31st ed. 1949). Alabama, California, Con-
necticut, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Texas and Vermont. Delaware requires that the student register six months
before he commences his clerkship; however, as the Board meets once a year, the
effective date of registration may be earlier.
15. Delaware-18 months. Georgia, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, West Virginia
-one year. Arizona, New Jersey-9 months. Arkansas, Maine, Nevada, New Mexico,
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia-6 months. Cali-
fornia, Florida, Idaho, Mississippi, Utah, Washington-3 months. In Maryland the
student must be a resident at the time he registers; however, an application for regis-
tration may be filed nunc pro tunc in the discretion of the Board.
16. Horack, Trade Barriers to Bar Admissions, 28 ". Am. Jun. Soc'Y 102, 104
(1944).
17. James, Today's Selective Process for Adms son to the Bar, Paoc. I.LL. STATE
BAR Ass'W 51, 58 (1937).
18. See Lewis v. Lewis, 238 Mo. App. 173, 175, 176 S.W.2d 556, 560 (1943);
Thompson v. Mandhein, 180 Misc. 1002, 1003, 43 N.Y.S.2d 632, 633 (Sup. Ct. 1943),
aff'd, 266 App. Div. 1001, 45 N.Y.S. 2d 412 (1st Dep't 1943).
19. See Horack, supra note 16 at 104. But see McCracken, Character Examlna-
tion in Pennsylvania, 25 A.B.A.J. 873 (1939).
20. See Horack, sipra note 16 at 104.
21. McCormick, What Can Be Done to Improve Methods of Character Investi-
gation, 16 TENN. L. REv. 232, 233 (1940).
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Preliminary registration provisions are designed to eliminate the
morally unfit applicant before he acquires the equities of a law school
education.2 2  Investigation at this stage eliminates waste and allows the
committee to exercise its judgment unhampered by these equities; 23 fur-
thermore, it provides a period during which the profession can closely
observe the neophyte and inculcate in him a sense of his public responsi-
bility.2 4  The proponents of early registration also stress the in terrorem
effect of the requirement, which discourages unfit applicants from en-
rolling at a law school.25  Moral character, however, is an elusive con-
cept, and in practice it is virtually impossible to predict which applicants
will resort to unethical practice after admission.2 6  Character studies indi-
cate that generalized character traits on which to make valid prognostica-
tions are non-existent,2 7 and that presently developed techniques for se-
curing general impressions are still so imperfect as to be unreliable.25
Likewise, lawyers have expressed opinions that professional moral weak-
ness is only revealed under economic pressure.2 9 Consequently, the appli-
cants eliminated in the initial examination have been few, and only those
of obviously unsavory pasts.30 In the ensuing years, surveillance of the
applicants by the bar association has usually been abandoned as an ex-
cessive burden, or turned over to the law schools.31 The practical effect,
then, of registration is only to eliminate those who are obviously un-
qualified, a result which could be accomplished by a commercial investiga-
tion conducted shortly before the bar examination.32 Additionally, an
inquiry into the applicant's past by a trained investigator would be more
revealing than the limitations of a character committee make possible,3 3
and would, therefore, exercise a greater in terrorem effect. This leads to
22. Address by Lowell Wadmond, 65 REP. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'x 300, 310
(1942).
23. Clark, Bar Admissions and the Law Schools, 33 ILL. L. Rv. 898, 901 (1939);
Paper by Karl McCormick, 61 REP. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 82, 86 (1938).
24. Cook, Trends in Bar Admission Requiremwnts, 1 ALA. LAWYER 68 (1940);
Paper by Karl McCormick, 61 REP. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 82, 89 (1938); Clark,
Bar Admissions and the Law Schools, 33 ILL. L. REv. 898, 901 (1939).
25. Clark, Today's Selective Process for Admission to the Bar, Paoc. ILL. STATE
BAR Ass'N 38, 43 (1938) ; Paper by Will Shafroth, 62 REP. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N
81, 102 (1939).
26. Kirkwood, Some Problems in Admission to the Bar that Affect the Law
Schools, 9 Am. L. ScHooL REV. 554 (1939) ; Discussion by Rowland Davis, 61 REP.
N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 107 (1938).
27. STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF CHARACTER, Character Education Inquiry,
Teachers College, Columbia University, Vol. I at 15, 243, 411.
28. Id. at 215, 217.
29. Kirkwood, Some Problems in Admission to the Bar that Affect the Law
Schools, 9 Am. L. SCHooL REv. 554 (1939); Discussion by David Stein, 61 REP. N.Y.
STATE BAR Ass'x 110, 114 (1938); Report of the Committee on Legal Education
and Admission to the Bar, 17 MICH. STATE BAR J. 47, 50 (1937).
30. McCormick, What Can be Donw to Improve Methods of Character Investi-
gation, 16 TENN. L. REv. 232, 234 (1940); Paper by Will Shafroth, 62 REP. N.Y.
STATE BAR Ass'N 80, 97 (1939).
31. Andrews, The Problem of Admision to th Bar, 24 A.B.A.J. 365 (1938).
32. Kentucky employs the services of the National Conference of Bar Examiners
to investigate non-resident applicants. James, Today's Selective Process for Admis-
sion to the Bar, PROC. ILL. STATE BAR Ass'N 54, 60 (1937).
33. Character committees do not have the facilities to make a thorough investi-
gation. Paper by Paul Andrews, 61 REP. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 82, 93 (1938).
Many have little more than a power of recommendation. Paper by Will Shafroth,
62 REP. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'x 80, 97 (1939).
the conclusion that since alternate methods are available to accomplish
similar results, registration should be made freely waivable.34 This would
allow prompt admission of the student with a clean record, who has grad-
uated from a law school of high standing, and would also remove the
premium now placed on far-sighted selection of a jurisdiction in which
to register.
Minimum Educational Requirements.-Educational requirements are
also the subject of exclusionary and discriminatory practices. Nine juris-
dictions admit graduates of local schools without examination, while re-
quiring graduates of out-of-state law schools to pass bar examinations,
regardless of equal or superior educational qualifications. 35  Montana re-
quires that non-resident applicants meet, in addition to local rules, any
prerequisite imposed on a Montana resident who applies for admission in
the state from which the candidate has removed. 36  This type of rule
certainly does not serve to secure professional competence. Three states
bar the student who has not received credit for certain specified pre-
legal courses. 37 Although college courses probably increase the applicant's
intellectuality, the relevance of a given college course to the candidate's
legal ability is doubtful. The rule serves chiefly to pose a barrier to the
applicant who failed to select the restricting jurisdiction as his future
home five to seven years in advance of the time for admission.
Clerkship Requirements.-In five jurisdictions a  applicants must
serve six to eight months as the clerk of an experienced practitioner after
graduation from law school. In this way, it is hoped that the theoretical
education of the academic institution will be supplemented by realistic
training in legal practice, and that the neophyte will be inculcated with a
consciousness of the ethical obligation he owes to the public and the
profession.
39
The proponents of this system analogize it to the compulsory med-
ical internship plan; certain differences, however, not only make the
analogy unsound, but also may nullify any advantage to be gained from
the clerkship system. In the medical profession an entire hospital staff
is available to instruct and supervise the interne, and the financial burden
of the plan is absorbed by the hospital. In the clerkship system the pre-
ceptor is the sole advisor to the clerk, so that the value of this indoctrina-
tion period depends entirely on his ability and interest.40  Difficulty in
obtaining the services of qualified preceptors has led to the rejection of
the plan in at least three jurisdictions.4 1 Furthermore, unlike law school
education, the clerkship involves discrimination in the quality of the in-
struction received, since the influential student will be in a position to
secure" the supervision of the most experienced practitioner while less
fortunate students must seek committee assistance in obtainina a pre-
34. Some of the states allow students to file applications nune pro tuc in "ex-
ceptional and meritorious cases" (North Carolina).
35. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Mississippi, South Carolina, South Dakota,
West Virginia, Wisconsin.
36. RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR 192 (West Publ. Co., 31st ed. 1949).
37. Delaware, Maryland, North Dakota.
38. Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont. There was
also a clerkship in New York prior to 1933.
39. Smith, Readers Defend and Oppose Legal Intemship, 30 J. Ams. Jun. Soc'v
61 (1946) ; Rose, Apprenticeship and Probationary Plans for Admission to the Bar,
5 ALA. LAWYER 85 (1944).
40. Kansas City Lawyers' Committee Investigates and Disapproves Internship
Proposals, 30 J. AaI. JuD. Soc'y 192, 193 (1947) ; Paper by Mark Lefever, id. at 61.
41. Kansas, Michigan, Texas.
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ceptor.42  The Board of Bar Examiners has usually found the burden of
supervision insufferable; 43 consequently, with many clerks serving apa-
thetic attorneys, there is little possibility of minimum requirements or
uniform standards.4 ' In addition, there is no uniform practice in regard
to remuneration in any of the states, the matter being left to private
arrangement between the parties. Since the service is compulsory, oppor-
tunity is afforded the practitioner to avail himself of continued clerk
service at a minimum expense.45  This imposes a heavy burden on the
student whose finances already are overladen with law school and, often,
family expenditures.
4 6
A poll was made for the purposes of this Note of members of the
bars of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, who had served clerkships within
the last three years, to determine their reaction to the present system in
their respective states. Of the two hundred replies received,47 the two
most prevalent objections stemmed from lack of supervision and remunera-
tion. More than one-third of the writers from both states desired more
supervision.48  One-half of the Pennsylvania clerks reported that they re-
ceived no pay. The New Jersey clerks fared better, only twenty-two per-
cent receiving less than expenses. 49  Significantly, one-half of the Penn-
sylvania and thirty-five percent of the New Jersey replies expressed the
opinion that the system should not be continued in its present form. The
large majority of this group were dissatisfied primarily because of either
one or the other of the above mentioned complaints.
Whether the clerkship system justifies its existence will ultimately
depend on the size of the town and other conditions peculiar to the local-
ity.5 0 However, the deficiencies of the law school curriculum which the
clerkship system is designed to meet may in part be remedied by alternate
means. Moot court arguments, instruction in drafting legal instruments,
and courses in legal ethics are a certain amount of aid, although they lack
the quality of actual experience.51 Duke University, at least, has intro-
duced this element by requiring third-year students to handle cases in
the local legal aid clinic. 52  This practical contact enables the student to
temper his analysis of the theoretical problems presented in school with
42. Kansas City Lawyers' Comdttee Investigates and Disapproves Internship
Proposals, 30 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 192, 193 (1947).
43. Report of the Committee on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, 17
MicH. STATE BAR J. 47, 48 (1937).
44. Black, Readers Defend and Oppose Legal Internship, 30 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y
61 (1946).
45. Kansas City Lawyers' Committee Investigates and Disapproves Internship
Proposals, 30 J. Am. Jvrn. Soc'y 192, 193 (1947) ; Handy, Today's Selective Process
for Admission to the Bar, Paoc. ILL. STATE BAR Ass'x 44, 52 (1937) ; Address by
Elliott Cheatham, 66 REP'. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 256, 269 (1943).
46. Discussion by Robert Noonan, 61 RE!. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 115, 117
(1938).
47. This represents approximately 60% of the questionnaires which were mailed.
48. Pennsylvania, 39%; New Jersey, 36%.
49. PA. N.J.
$150/month and over 14% 14%
$150/month and under 24% 40%
Expenses 14% 24%
Nothing 48% 22%
50. See article cited, note 42 supra, at 196.
51. Silver, Law Students and the Law: "Experience-Employment" in Legal Edu-
cation, 35 A.B.A.J. 991 (1949).
52. At least fourteen other law schools had similar projects prior to the war.
Winters, Legal Aid and Legal Internship Should Go Together, 30 J. Am. JUD. Sod"
35 (1946).
an awareness of the way in which such problems are likely actually to be
presented to him. If it is felt that this aspect of legal education should be
controlled by the bar, an amalgamation of legal aid clinics and the clerk-
ship system could be effected, somewhat along the lines of medical intern-
ship.53 The cases presented admittedly would be of a restricted nature;
however, the system would provide the embryo lawyer with actual ex-
perience in writing briefs and dealing with clients under the continued
surveillance of experienced practitioners. The financial burden of the
student, in addition, could in part be absorbed as a cost of the clinic.
Evaluation.-The current law school graduate tends to be older than
his predecessors, and, due to the war's disrupting influence, is not so
likely to return home. Consequently, restrictions which delay his en-
trance into active practice or limit the area from which he may select a
job are increasingly important, especially in this age of specialization.
Residence requirements should be reexamined: it does not raise the
standards of the bar to require that the applicant wait a year or longer
before he is admitted .
4
Where an attorney resorts to unethical practice because his intel-
lectual incompetency makes it impossible for him to get legitimate busi-
ness, the obvious remedy is a higher educational standard.55 In this the
law school is the moving factor.5 6 Since it is at most doubtful whether
the best training will develop the lesser student into a competent lawyer,
the initial step should be to limit enrollment to those in a stated percentile
of their college class or ranking favorably on carefully planned objective
tests.67 There are a number of objective tests which show a high degree
of correlation between predicted and actual academic achievement.58 Such
examinations have the further advantage of forming an impartial criterion
for admission which cannot be assailed as undemocratic. Probably the
quickest method to improve educational standards would be to make the
law school responsible for its graduates as is done in California. There
the law school loses its accreditation if a stated minimum percentage of its
graduates do not pass the bar examination. The inevitable opposition
of the law schools to such a penalty creates a possible objection to the
implementation of the plan, but California's apparent success with this
system warrants that it be considered by other states.59
Where the lawyer engages in unethical practice because it is more
profitable or through sheer indolence, the problem is more difficult.
53. Id. at 36.
54. Horack Trade Barriers to Bar Admissions, 28 Am. JUD. Soc'y 102, 105 (1944).
55. California requires that all students pass a state examination at the end of
their first year. Applicants enrolled in accredited schools are exempt.
56. Law schools seem to have been largely responsible for improved quality of
the bar in the past 95% of all applicants in N.Y. during the years 1922 to 1927
eventually passed the bar examinations; they do not pose a barrier to the persistent
applicant. It has been suggested that this situation should be remedied by limiting
the number of times one may take the examination. Paper by Will Shafroth, 62
REP. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 81, 83 (1939); Phillips, Building a Better Bar, 8 Am.
L. ScHOOL REV. 4, 5 (1934).
57. Shea, Overcrowded-The Price of Certain Remedies, 39 COL. L. Rav. 191, 214
(1939) ; Clarke, Today's Selective Process for Admission to the Bar, Pnoc. ILL. STATE
BAR Ass'N 38, 39 (1937).
58. Gulliver, The Use of a Legal Aptitude Test in the Selection of Law School
Students, 9 Am. L. ScHOOL REv. 560 (1939); Wagner, Generalizations Regarding
Prediction, 9 U. oF Bt'FALo STUDIES 184, 185 (1934).
59. Clark, Some Random Comments by a Former Member of the Committee of
Bar Examiners, 18 CALIF. STATE BAR 3. 5, 13 (1943) ; Handy, Today's Selective
Process for Admission to the Bar, PRoc. ILL. STATE BAR Ass'N 44, 48 (1937).
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Although intellect and honor are not synonymous, there is evidence that
cultural training tends to develop the personality ethically. 60 Thus pre-
legal education 61 contributes a certain moral background of stamina, by
tending to eliminate the weaker men preliminarily. The law schools may
attack the problem by incorporating in their curriculum comprehensive,
practical, and effectively taught courses in legal ethics. 62 The bar com-
mittee will ultimately have to pass on all candidates if there is to be any
measure of uniformity and centralized control, but if the student can sus-
tain the burden of showing good moral character through an independent
investigation, 63 registration and residence requirements should be made
freely waivable. In Texas, the committee automatically dispenses with
the registration provision if the applicant has graduated from an accredited
law school and was not a resident of Texas at the time he enrolled.
ATTORNEY APPLICANTS
As an attorney becomes farther removed from the systematized knowl-
edge of his law school days, his chances of success on the bar examination
will decrease, in spite of the fact that his general ability may have in-
creased through active practice. 64 Rather than compel these men to take
a prolonged and wasteful cram course, the vast majority of states grant
admission on motion,65 or give special attorneys' examinations. 66  The
requirements prerequisite to such admission vary greatly; generally, how-
ever, they provide for residence, admission to practice before the highest
court of another state, and active practice of law for a period of years.
Standards of Proficiency.-Those states which require previous prac-
tice usually limit the period to three or five years, but two states require
at least eight years.67  This period of seasoning forms a basis on which
to evaluate the attorney's merit and moral qualifications. It also deters
the student who cannot gain admission directly from circumventing high
standards by seeking admission on motion from a jurisdiction of low re-
quirements. Although this rule serves to protect the quality of the bar,
it is usually mandatory and therefore bars the applicant who has com-
pensatory personal qualifications. A number of states, consequently, have
alternate provisions which permit admission without practice if the appli-
cant's educational background meets the requirements of the admitting
state.68  Frequently, however, the practice and equivalent education rules
60. Paper by Will Shafroth, 62 REP. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 81, 96 (1939).
61. The rejections and withdrawals of the college men on the character test were
only one-fourth as many as for other classes of candidates in Pennsylvania. Ibid.
62. "A course in legal ethics should be part of the curriculum of every law school.
It should be taught by the case method and presented in such a way as to tie up
with all courses and should include a discussion as to fees, methods of dealing with
and charging clients, and something of law office management." Allan Wright, 61
REP. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 118, 122 (1938).
63. See note 32 supra.
64. Problems of the Migratory Lawyer, 13 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 4 (1929).
65. The minority of jurisdictions which apparently require the foreign attorney
to pass the same examination given students includes Arizona, Colorado, Florida,
Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey, and West Virginia.
66. California, Delaware, Kansas, and Washington.
67. Pennsylvania (8), Rhode Island (10). In addition, Florida requires ten years'
practice for all attorney applicants before they may be admitted to examination.
68. Montana, Nebraska. Several states recognize this principle but limit admis-
sion on motion by a comity requirement. District of Columbia (District Court),
Tennessee. In addition, Illinois and Texas reduce their requirement of previous prac-
tice if the applicant presents equal educational qualifications.
are made mandatory and conjunctive requirements.69 Such restrictions
assume that the necessary preparation may not be obtained by other means,
and in addition, absolutely bar many attorneys who have practiced ex-
tensively but were admitted when educational requirements were mini-
mum. While four of these states 70 admit the candidate if his education
meets their requirements, three 7 ' grant admission only if the state from
which the applicant removed has substantially equivalent rules, making
admission turn on the standards of the state in which the applicant has
practiced, rather than on the qualifications of the applicant himself. The
education and previous practice rules are both designed to maintain the
quality of the bar, and as such are justifiable, but their purpose is comple-
mentary. It is submitted that they should be applied only in the alternative.
Another frequently found provision limits admission on motion to
attorneys who seek to transfer from a state which grants similar privi-
leges.72  While these states waive bar examinations, all retain rules gov-
erning previous practice and the majority require that specified educa-
tional requirements be met.73  Two states, 74 in addition, require that the
applicant meet any rules of the former jurisdiction which exceed those of
the admitting state. Comity provisions do not serve to improve the
quality of the bar, but merely exclude attorneys applying from states which
refuse to accept the standards of the admitting state. They may have some
long-term effect, however, in persuading the more restrictive states to
extend reciprocal benefits.
Residence Requirements.-A minority of jurisdictions 75 require a
migrant attorney to reside within the admitting state from three months
to a year prior to admission. These requirements are even less justifiable
here than in the case of a student, since the attorney has a past record
of practice which is freely available to scrutiny. Furthermore, the National
Conference of Bar Examiners has established an investigating procedure
which makes a thorough inquiry into the attorney-applicant's educational
and professional record, leaving little of the lawyer's moral character
which is not revealed. Residence for one year does little to establish
character since the unfit attorney will purposely live an irreproachable
life; therefore, requirement of residence operates only to exclude the
able lawyer who will not abandon his established office. The unsuccessful
or disbarred attorney will be ready to wait the required time.
76
Another group of states require that the applicant reside 77 or intend
to reside 78 within the state prior to admission, although no stated period
69. Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, and Vermont. Missis-
sippi also applies the two rules conjunctively, and in addition imposes a comity re-
quirement.
70. Connecticut, Indiana, Ohio, and Vermont.
71. Arkansas, Missouri, and Oregon. In addition, the rules of equal education
applied in Kentucky and Illinois are based on the rules imposed in the other jurisdic-
tion; however, such rules are not mandatory and the applicant may be admitted on
motion under alternate provisions.
72. District of Columbia (District Court), Georgia, Mississippi, Montana (if
applicant is not a resident of Montana), North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.
73. District of Columbia (District Court), Mississippi, Montana, Tennessee,
Texas.
74. Oklahoma, Utah.
75. E.g., North Carolina (1 year), Texas (3 months).
76. See Horack, supra note 16, at 103.
77. E.g., Iowa, Maryland.
78. E.g., Missouri, Ohio.
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of residence is necessary.79 All such rules effectively preclude an attorney
from being admitted without changing his domicile,8 0 although it would
obviously be a business advantage to allow a certain amount of mobility.8 '
The requirement is predicated on the danger which would supposedly
inure to the administration of justice if a person who resided beyond the
jurisdiction of the court exercised intra-territorial functions.8 2  But resi-
dence does not give the courts any increased control over the attorney.
It does not imply ownership of assets which would permit an in ren
proceeding; 83 furthermore, personal jurisdiction over the non-resident
attorney for purposes of suits arising out of his business within the state
might be obtained by requiring him to appoint a local official as his agent
for service as a condition of his admission to the bar.8 4 Since the threat
of disbarment, as a method of preserving professional decorum, does not
discriminate between the non-resident and the resident lawyer, the state
is adequately protected.8 5 As the client is aware of the attorney's non-
residence at the time of employment, no injustice results to him, even if
he is forced to sue the lawyer in the state of residence; and this, in fact,
may be the most convenient procedure, since the client will most fre-
quently be a resident of the same state as the attorney. Service of plead-
ings and notices extra-territorially does not seem to be a serious problem.
although it may result in some inconvenience to opposing lawyers. Most
statutes contemplate service by mail after the attorney has appeared, but
if this is doubtful, consent thereto might be required as a condition of
appearing. 86
Evaluation.-Many lawyers desire to cross state lines in mid-career
to accept better posts or to represent inter-state business interests. In
addition, the young attorney's natural impulse may be to move early in
his career in an effort to find a suitable job. A majority of jurisdictions
give very limited recognition to these interests by allowing an attorney
to argue a case pro hac vice, although even this privilege may be further
limited by a comity restriction.87  Oklahoma, furthermore, grants a tem-
porary permit, without examination, to an attorney who removes to that
79. In absence of statute, the Wisconsin court has held that residence is required.
It re Mosnes, 39 Wis. 509 (1876).
80. However, when a lawyer migrates from one state to another he does not
necessarily lose his right to practice in the first state. Statutes and rules are usually
not explicit on this point, but some case authority indicates that one loses his right
to practice by change of residence, although membership in the bar is not thereby
lost. In re Pierce, 789 Wis. 441, 307 N.W. 966 (1926). Nevada expressly provides
that attorneys lose their right to practice alone in Nevada courts when they cease to
be residents.
81. Biever, Admission of Attorneys from Other States, 2 BAR EXAMINER 73, 81
(1932).
82. Atkinson and Penney, Practice in Kansasr by Nonresident lawyers, 2 J. BAR
Ass'N, STATE OF KANS., 110, 122 (1933).
83. Furthermore, a committee of the American Bar Association recommended a
resolution condemning the bonding of attorneys, since it detracts from the guarantee
of character accompanying bar membership. 68 A.B.A. REP. 285, 292 (1923).
84. Morris v. Douglass, 237 App. Div. 747, 262 N.Y.S. 712 (lst Dep't 1933);
Copin v. Adamson, L.R. 9, Ex. 345 (1875).
85. It is unnecessary to obtain personal service within the jurisdiction for disbar-
ment. it re Craven, 169 La. 555, 125 So. 591 (1929).
86. See Atldnson and Penney, supra note 82, at 123.
87. Florida and Louisiana. Oklahoma allows an attorney to argue single cases
alone if his state grants similar privileges; otherwise, he must associate with a
resident attorney.
state to do business for his former employer. Such rules reduce the
inconvenience and expense implicit in state barriers, although the lawyer's
position is still relatively immobile.
Many of the restrictive provisions existing today were originally in-
tended to protect the bar from migrant attorneys shifting from one juris-
diction to another. Today, however, the work of the American Bar
Association in the investigation of comity applicants has reduced this
threat to a minimum, and consequently, better quality at the bar could
be attained if residence requirements with attendant idleness were abol-
ished and the applicant required only to file notice of his desire to be
admitted.88 Furthermore, the experience requirement could safely be
eliminated if the educational qualifications of the candidate satisfied the
admitting state's rules with respect to student applicants. 89 Finally, the
Boards should be given greater discretion. The greatest objection to
many of the existing restrictions is that they apply uniformly to all appli-
cants from a particular jurisdiction. This works an obvious injustice to
the applicant who is personally qualified but applies from a jurisdiction of
low requirements.
M. S. M.
Some Aspects of Competency and Privileged Communications
in the Federal Criminal Courts
In federal criminal prosecutions, admissibility of evidence is gov-
erned by Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,' which
provides that "admissibility of evidence and competency of witnesses shall
be governed, except when Act of Congress or these rules otherwise pro-
vide, by principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." Only
four years have elapsed since the adoption of the rule, so that judgment
may yet be premature, but it may be remarked at the outset that no sub-
stantial changes have been wrought by it, nor by the courts working under
it, in that part of the criminal law of evidence which deals with privilege
against third persons' testimony or disclosure of communications by the
defendant, or with the competency of spouses. If any changes are desir-
able, it may be necessary, therefore, to turn to legislative relief or rules
of court, either piecemeal or in the form of a complete federal code of
evidence. This Note attempts to summarize the present state of the law
in these areas, to criticize shortcomings, particularly by comparison with
the most advanced state rules, and to present the background story of
the sources of the federal criminal law of evidence. Those aspects of
competency, such as mental and moral incapacity, and personal interest,
which have been thoroughly settled for many years, are not treated
independently.
SOURCES OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW OF EVIDENCE
In 1853, the Supreme Court had presented to it, in United States v.
Reid,2 for the first time the question of whether the federal courts were
required to adopt the state rules of evidence in a prosecution under a
88. See Horack, supra note 16, at 103.
89. Letter by Dazell, 13 J.D.C. BAit Ass'N 242, 243 (1946).
1. Prescribed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (Supp. 1949).
2. 12 How. 361 (U.S. 1851).
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federal statute. The "conformity" principle was embodied in the Rules
of Decision Act of 1789,3 which provided that "the laws of the several
states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United
States, otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision
in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply." Did "trials at common law" include criminal prose-
cutions? The Court answered, "No," and refused to apply a Virginia
statute enacted in 1849 making a co-defendant a competent witness. The
applicable rule, the Court concluded, after examining other sections of
the Act of 1789, was the law of the state, as it was when the courts of the
United States were established in 1789.4 The result of the decision was
to deny to the criminal courts the conformity principle and the new views
on evidence being developed in the states.5
Subsequently the problem arose as to what evidence applied in the
courts of the states that were admitted to the union after 1789. In Logan
v. United States,6 decided in 1891, the Court, after following the general
principles of the Reid case, held that the law applicable to a trial sitting
in Texas was that of the state as of the time of its admission to the Union.
A statute recently enacted in Texas was ignored, but a statute of the
Republic of Texas,7 providing that the common law of England should
govern, was held binding on the trial court.
That the Court recognized the unsatisfactory result to be had from
adherence to antiquated rules of evidence is perhaps shown in retrospect
by Benson v. United States,$ decided only eight months after the Logan
case. Here, in a case arising from the Kansas district court, the Court
ignored both the Logan case and a territorial statute of Kansas similar
to the Republic of Texas statute held controlling in that case,9 and instead
examined the common law authorities, without explaining the sudden shift
in sources. It may be significant that the decision concluded that the
better common law rule favored the competency of a co-indictee offered
by the defense. The Benson case introduced a state of confusion in the
lower federal courts, whose practical result was merely to continue the
dominance of the straightforward, if undesirable, rules of the Reid and
Logan cases. 10
It was not until 1918, however, that the Supreme Court began to
provide clear signals that it considered evolution of the federal criminal
law of evidence desirable. In Rosen v. United States," a government
witness who had previously been convicted of forgery in a state court was
held competent to testify in a federal district court of New York. To
the objection that the Reid case required the application of the New York
rule of 1789, the Court replied that the Logan and Benson cases had
3. 1 STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U.S.C. § 725 (1946), changed to reflect the Reid inter-
pretation in 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (Supp. 1949), to read "civil actions" in place of "trials
at common law."
4. 12 How. at 363, 365.
5. It will be noted that most of the leading Supreme Court cases have dealt with
questions of competency and privileged communications in the criminal courts, but the
issue of applicable rules applies to all the problems of evidence alike.
6. 144 U.S. 263 (1891).
7. 1 REPU LXc OF TEXAS LAWS 156 (1838).
8. 146 U.S. 325 (1892).
9. KAN. TERR. STAT., c. 96, § 1 (1855).
10. E.g., Maxey v. United States, 207 Fed. 327 (8th Cir. 1913) ; Brown v. United
States, 233 Fed. 353 (6th Cir. 1916) ; Knoell v. United States, 239 Fed. 16 (3rd Cir.
1917) ; Ding v. United States, 247 Fed. 12 (9th Cir. 1918).
11. 245 U.S. 467 (1918).
"severely shaken" the older case's holding.' 2  The dictum of the Benson
case that questions of competency were to be examined "in the light of
general authority and sound reason" was stressed to reach the conclusion
that "the dead hand of the common law of 1789" was no longer to be
controlling.'3
Despite two apparent retreats from the liberating principle of the
Rosen case, 14 the Court has progressively given effect to it. In Funk v.
United States,15 the doctrines of the Reid and Logan cases were expressly
repudiated. Holding that the wife of a defendant in a criminal case is a
competent witness in his behalf, the Court stressed the idea that ancient
rules should not shackle the courts because of a failure of the Congress,
but that the rules should be formulated "in accordance with present day
standards of wisdom and justice rather than in accordance with some
outworn and antiquated rule of the past." 16
Shortly thereafter, and in the same term, the Court found an oppor-
tunity to enlarge its pronouncement in the Funk case. In Wolfle v.
United States,17 a case arising from the district court of Washington, the
Court rejected the reasoning of the Circuit Court of Appeals, which
applied a statute of the territory of Washington, and stated that the rules
of competency for criminal trials "are not necessarily restricted to those
local rules in force at the time of the admission into the union of the par-
ticular state where the trial took place, but are governed by common law
principles as interpreted and applied by the Federal courts in the light
of reason and experience." I It was also stated that the admission of
evidence in general was to be governed by the same rule as applied to
competency. In the absence of federal statutes, common law principles,
as interpreted by the federal courts, were to prevail. The federal courts
were now free to reduce uncertainty and conflict and to achieve a uniform
law of evidence despite the lack of an extended codification of that law.
The character of that uniformity remains to be discussed.
In 1940, when the Supreme Court had vested in it the power to
regulate the pleading and procedure in the criminal courts,19 it appointed
an Advisory Committee to assist in the preparation of Rules of Criminal
Procedure .2 0  Much discussion among legal scholars was expended upon
the form which the rules of evidence should take in criminal cases. The
committee was subjected to views from all sides,2 ' some suggesting a
12. 245 U.S. at 471.
13. 245 U.S. at 472.
14. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), where the defendant had
been convicted on evidence obtained through wire-tapping, the Court ruled that wire-
tapping was not a constitutional question, because it did not constitute search and
seizure; therefore admissibility was purely an evidence question, seemingly to be de-
cided on the basis of Reid and Logan cases. In Jui Fuey Mow v. United States, 254
U.S. 189 (1920), the Court held a defendant's wife incompetent to contradict a gov-
ernment witness. Justice Sutherland, in Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 386
(1933), explained that the acceptance of the court of an improvident concession of
counsel was the cause of the decision.
15. 290 U.S. 371 (1933), 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 406 (1934); 47 HARv. L. Rv.
853 (1934) ; 43 YALE L.J. 849 (1934).
16. 290 U.S. at 383.
17. 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
18. 291 U.S. at 12.
19. 54 STAT. 688 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (Supp. 1949).
20. The work of the committee is discussed in Holtzoff, Reform of Federal
Criminal Procedure, 12 Gao. WAsHi. L. REv. 119 (1944).
21. Vanderbilt, New Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure, 29 A.B.A.J. 377
(1943); Cummings, Tlw Third Great Experiment, 29 A.B.A.J. 654 (1943); Medalie,
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 4 LAw GUILD REV., No. 3, p. 1 (1944).
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complete federal code, in the nature of the Model Code of Evidence, a
few desiring that the criminal courts should adopt the rule of conformity
and liberality existing in the civil courts, and others advocating a limited
codification through rules of court, leaving controversial matter for more
extended consideration and study. The end-product of this mountain of
labor was exceedingly cautious. In the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure which became effective in March, 1946, Rule 26 was adopted. Its
purpose was to codify the then-existing law, as stated in the Funk and
Wolfle cases,2 2 and it was contemplated that it should not depend on
older decisions alone, but that federal courts would be free to take cog-
nizance of altered conditions, and the weight of current judicial authority
elsewhere.23
That the courts have been capable of such progressive development is
well illustrated by the history of the general disqualification of persons
as witnesses upon grounds of mental and moral incapacity. From a be-
ginning in the early common law which disqualified persons adjudged
non compos mentis,2 4 children of tender years,25 non-Christians, 26 and
convicted felons,2 7 capacity to be a witness has been steadily liberalized
until most jurisdictions disqualify only for such basic defects as inability
to observe, recollect, and narrate facts, or lack of moral responsibility.
28
In the federal criminal courts, especially, the entire process has been
accomplished by judicial decision unaided by legislation,29 except for a
single statute creating the admissibility of a former perjurer's testimony.3 0
The balance of this Note is concerned with a detailed examination
of spouses' competency and certain privileged communications, relatively
22. See NOTES OF ADVIsORY COMMITTEE ON RULES, following FED. R. CRIM.
P. 26.
23. For more extensive coverage of the history of the development of evidence in
the federal criminal courts, see Leach, State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts,
43 HHAv. L. REv. 554 (1930); Howard, Evidence in Federal Criminal Trials, 51
YALE L.J. 763 (1942); Bronaugh, Competency of Husband or Wife as Witness in
Criminal Case in the Federal Court, 4 LAw NoTEs 112 (1927).
24. 58 Am. Jur. § 118 (1948).
25. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 505 (3d ed. 1940).
26. Co. LITr. 6b (1628) (an infidel could not be a witness). But see Omichund
v. Barker, Willes Rep. 538, 125 Eng. Rep. 1310 (Ch. 1744).
27. Brown v. United States, 233 Fed. 353 (6th Cir. 1916) ; Bise v. United States,
144 Fed. 374, 375 (8th Cir. 1906).
28. 2 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 492 (3d ed. 1940). See id. § 488 for statutory en-
actments in the various states.
29. Insanity.-The leading federal case on insanity, District of Colurmbia v.
Armes, 107 U.S. 519 (1882), which dealt with a civil matter, adopted the rule of the
English case of Regina v. Hill, 2 Denison 254, 169 Eng. Rep. 495 (Ct. C.C.R. 1851),
which held that an insane person may testify if, at the time of his testimony, he under-
stands the obligation of the oath required of him and is able to give a correct account
of the matter he is reporting. Accord, United States ex rel. Lo Pizzo v. Mathers,
36 F.2d 565 (3rd Cir. 1929); Ross v. United States, 93 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1939).
Infancy.-The Supreme Court stated, in Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523
(1895), that the test for infants is that they should have sufficient intelligence to have
a just appreciation of the difference between right and wrong and a proper conscious-
ness of the punishment of false swearing.
Infamy.-Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918) (eliminated the disqualifi-
cation for infamy).
Moral Obligation.-It seems that there is no requirement of any particular re-
ligious belief, because of a lack of cases. But cf. United States v. Miller, 236 Fed.
798 (W.D. Wash. 1916) ; Louie Ding v. United States, 247 Fed. 12 (9th Cir. 1918).
30. The former perjury statute, REV. STAT. § 5392 (1875), provided expressly
that convicted perjurers were incompetent. The present statute, 35 STAT. 1111 (1909),
18 U.S.C. § 231 (1946), has deleted the disqualification; this change has been held to
indicate Congressional intent to remove the disability. Latigis v. United States, 97
F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1938) ; Lucks v. United States, 100 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1939).
less well-known areas of the federal criminal law of evidence. At the
outset, it should be noted that the District of Columbia Code contains
certain sections regarding evidence, which provide specific provisions con-
cerning competency.3 1 These will be noted when pertinent.
COMPETENCY AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS IN MARITAL RELATIONS
It is important at the outset of any discussion of the rules relating
to the competency of husband and wife as witnesses to prevent confusion
by noting the inter-relation of the rules. Two distinct rules govern the
relation of husband and wife as witnesses.
The first is the broad rule originating in the old common law con-
ception that the spouses are one in law. It states that either, being a
party to an action or interested in the outcome, is incompetent for or
against the other where the other is in fact a party or interested in the
outcome. Further justification for the rule was adduced from the public
policy of preventing domestic discord by forestalling quarrels between man
and wife about what one might or had said on the witness stand for or
against the other. Since the general rule of the common law that parties
and persons interested are incompetent to testify is now usually abrogated,
it might well be thought that its offspring, the rule making spouses incom-
petent as witnesses would likewise fall. But although large inroads have
been made upon it, such is not universally the case. It has not been
wholly abrogated because of the second reason adduced in its support,
namely that it fosters domestic harmony and prevents discord. The after
thought has now become the actual reason for the rule.
The second rule is that neither spouse shall be permitted to testify
against the other with regard to marital communications. Of separate
origin, it rests not upon technical reasons, but upon public policy stronger
than that of the first rule. It seeks not alone to safeguard domestic
harmony, but also to make the marriage relation desirable by encouraging
and keeping inviolate those acts and confidences which strengthen the
intimate and constant relation of man and wife. More narrow than the
first rule as to subject matter, since it safeguards only those acts and
communications done or made by virtue of, or in the course of the marital
relation and in reliance on the privacy of such relation, it is a rule of
privilege.
The federal courts early adopted the universal common law rule
forbidding the spouse to testify because of the identity of interest and
danger of perjury,3 2 and the rule was maintained in its entirety even
after interest no longer continued to be a valid policy for exclusion.
33
It was not until 1933, in Funk v. United States,34 that the unbroken rule
31. D.C. CoDE, § 14-301 ff. (1941).
32. Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209 (U.S. 1839); Lucas v. Brooks, 85 U.S. 436
(1873) ; Hendrix v. United States, 219 U.S. 79 (1911).
33. It was believed at common law that a person interested in the outcome of an
action could not be relied on accurately and truly to testify in respect to material facts.
The temptation to falsify, it was felt, was too great for the average witness to resist
testifying in favor of the interest. 2 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 575 (3d ed. 1940).
This "fallacy" was bitterly attacked by Jeremy Bentham in RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EviDENcE 327-345 (1827). In 1878 a federal statute permitted the defendant in criminal
cases to testify at his own request, 20 STAT. 30 (1878), 28 U.S.C. § 632 (1946),
repealed, 62 STAT: 862 (1948). As a result, it was held that a person jointly indicted
with the defendant, but separately tried was not disqualified to be a witness for the
government. United States v. Benson, 146 U.S. 325 (1892).
34. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
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of a wife being incompetent to testify for her husband was repudiated.
The decision was overdue, since the bar of incompetency had been long
removed from the most interested party, the accused himself,35 so that
there was little reason to continue to exclude a wife on the ground of
interest. No Supreme Court decision, however, has considered the propriety
of admitting the evidence of one spouse against the other, and at present the
rule preventing the spouse from testifying for the prosecution remains
dominant in the lower federal courts, with some rumblings of discord.
General Privilege Against Adverse Testimony of Spouse.-Adverse
testimony of the spouse presents considerations different from those in
the question of incompetency based on interest. Most of the federal courts
treat it as a matter of competence, 36 often stating that a wife is incom-
petent to testify for or against her husband, no apparent distinction being
made between exclusion as a matter of disability or incapacity and ex-
clusion as a matter of privilege. 37  Some courts have expressly so held.38
The preferable and more logical view is, however, that while the question
of the favorable testimony of a spouse is one of competence, the question
of adverse testimony is one of privilege.3 9 In any event, the latter is
quite distinct from the former. The accepted rule that a wife may not
testify against her husband in a criminal trial rests on reasons which should
be separately examined before determining the present desirability of the
rule in the federal courts.
According to Wigmore, the real and sole reason behind this privilege
is the natural repugnance against compelling one spouse to be the means
of the other's condemnation. 40 This he criticizes as being not a reason
but a sentiment, exemplifying a spirit of sportsmanship having no place
in proceedings aimed at truth and justice. The most commonly advanced
reason for the privilege, however, is that it will protect the basic social
institution of marriage by preserving marital harmony. Wigmore points
out that if this is the true reason, the privilege is not scientifically applied,
since it is accorded even in those cases where marital harmony has already
been hopelessly disrupted.4 '
Others have criticized it as largely ineffective because its existence
is unknown to most laymen, who are unlikely to learn about it except
in the unusual event of becoming defendants in a criminal case, and on
the ground that the minute social benefit it accomplishes is far outweighed
by its hindrance of the process of fact finding. It is also pointed out
that it is not applied to any other family relationship than that of hus-
band and wife.42 Another objection has been that it is applied only when
one of the spouses is a defendant, but not to prevent spouses from giving
conflicting testimony as witnesses for different parties. The privilege has
also been criticized as a "curious piece of policy," in that it consults the
35. 20 STAT. 30 (1878) ; 28 U.S.C. §632 (1946), repealed, 62 STAT. 862 (1948).
36.2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 601 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, The Scope of
Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 Tzx. L. REv. 447 (1938).
37. This rule may have been a result of Coke's rationalization of the privilege,
namely, that a wife could not testify for or against her husband because they were
in effect one person. Co. Lrrr. 6b (1628).
38. Ex parte Belville, 58 Fla. 170, 50 So. 685 (1909) ; Barber v. People, 203 III.
543, 68 N.E. 93 (1920).
39. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 600, 601, 2228 (3d ed. 1940) ; Note, 33 HARV. L. REV.
873 (1920).
40. 8 WIGUoRE, EVIDENCE §2228(3)b (3d ed. 1940).
41. Id. at §2228(3)a.
42. Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence; Family
Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675 (1929).
wrongdoers' own interests in "determining whether justice shall have its
course against him." According to Bentham, it not only makes every
man's home his castle, but aids in converting it into a "den of thieves." 43
Most modern writers condemn the privilege,44 and so many exceptions
have arisen that doubt may be cast on the correctness of the general rule.45
Despite this array of criticism, only the Tenth Circuit has declared
the privilege obsolete. In Yoder v. United States,46 a case where a
divorced wife testified against her former husband, Judge McDermott
preferred to affirm the admission of the evidence on the ground that the
incompetence of a spouse to testify against the other had ceased, rather
than to say that the divorce had removed the privilege. 47  The opinion,
relying on the admonition of the Funk case to take the most enlightened
view of questions of admissibility of evidence, pointed to the marked
trend of state legislation to wipe out this form of privilege and to place
as much evidence into the hands of the triers of fact as possible.4 8  Al-
though commented upon favorably by legal writers,49 these views have
not been adopted by other circuits subsequently faced with the problem. 0
In a recent case in the Second Circuit, the majority suggested abrogation
of the prohibition, but said that it was for Congress to choose between
the conflicting views. 5 ' Judge Clark, dissenting, pleaded for the adoption
of the dictum of the Yoder case, and said that Rule 26 required the courts
to apply a "rational rule" which would be more commensurate with
modern life.
52
Although the present rule should be abandoned, it is not likely it
will happen unless Congress takes some action. The present trend of
43. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDIcIAL EvIDENcE b. IX, pt. IV, c. V (1827).
44. Hines, Privileged Testinwny of Husband and Wife in California, 19 CALIF. L.
REV. 390, 408 (1931).
45. See Note, 69 U. OF PA. L. REv. 164 (1921).
46. 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935).
47. Since the witness was divorced from her husband at the time of the trial,
the decision easily could have been rested upon the well-recognized ground that the
privilege does not apply after dissolution of marriage. 8 WIGMORE, EVMENCE § 2237
(3d ed. 1940). Furthermore, some decisions have held that adultery is to be deemed
an offense against the person of the wife. Id. at § 2239; Basset v. U.S., 137 U.S. 496
(1890). It would have been no great judicial innovation to extend this doctrine to the
Mann Act violation involved in the Yoder case.
48. 80 F.2d at 667.
49. 35 vlcH. L. REv. 329 (1935) ; 20 MINN. L. REv. 693 (1935) ; 10 So. CALIF.
L. REv. 94 (1935).
50. Paul v. United States, 79 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1935) ; Brunner v. United States,
168 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1948) (based on Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121
(1893), holding a wife incompetent to testify against her husband).
51. United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1949).
52. Id. at 569. In the Walker case, the defendant was on trial for acts which
he had also committed against his wife. The majority refused to apply the common-
law exception of necessity that when the wife is the victim of personal violence com-
mitted against her, she is qualified to testify against her husband in the trial for
such acts. Notes, 4 A.L.R. 1069 (1919), 16 A.L.R. 490 (1922), 35 A.L.R. 1132 (1925),
35 A.L.R. 138 (1925), 82 A.L.R. 644 (1933), 173 A.L.R. 378 (1948). Since the
federal courts had already extended this "exception of necessity" to the crime of
transporting one's wife in interstate commerce for immoral purposes, United States
v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943); Hoyes v. United States, 168 F.2d 996
(10th Cir. 1948); Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949); United
States v. Williams, 55 F. Supp. 375 (D. Minn. 1944) ; Judge Clark thought the excep-
tion should be carried to the situation in the instant case, by way of criticizing the
exception itself.
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state legislation has been to remove this disqualification,5 3 and in this
light Congress should provide for all the federal courts the same rule it
provided for the District of Columbia, which makes the spouses com-
petent for all purposes. 54  Short of such Congressional action, it is sug-
gested that the prohibition should only be enforced by the courts where
the policy behind the rule will in fact be accomplished. It should be left
to the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether permitting the
spouse to testify will tend to weaken the marriage, and if not the jury
should have the benefit of her information. 5
Privilege Against Disclosure of M-arital Communications.-Along
with the general privilege against a spouse's adverse testimony, another
privilege, considered by the federal courts to be distinct and co-existent,
forbids the revealing by one of the spouses of the marital disclosures of
the other.56  Its form is similar to that of the attorney-client privilege, in
that it requires that the communications arise out of the confidential re-
lationship of the spouses. 57  The first privilege is broader in that it ex-
cludes testimony to any adverse facts even though they have been learned
completely apart from the marital relationship.58  Unlike the general
privilege of the spouse to prevent adverse testimony of the other, the
privilege against disclosure of marital communications is not affected by
the death, divorce, or separation of the parties, and the other spouse is
never at liberty to reveal any information acquired during marriage.5 9
The federal decisions shed very little light on how far the definition
of communication will be carried. By the great weight of state authority,
communications include the observance of acts as well as the hearing or
seeing of the spoken or written word.60  A Second Circuit decision,
however, tends to sustain Wigmore's view that only utterances and not
acts, except in special circumstances, can constitute a communication. 61
Generally the privilege is lost when the conversation is overheard or the
communication gets into the hands of a third party.62 Although the
purpose of the privilege is to encourage the spouses to take each other
into their confidence and to reveal their secrets, in order to promote
happiness in marriages, it is felt that allowing third persons to report an
admission of the defendant would not defeat the policy of the rule. This
qualification seems defensible as a matter of degree, even though it might
make a spouse cautious, for fear of the possible presence of third persons,
but it is carried even farther by the federal courts, so as to deny con-
53. For collection of the state rules, see 2 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 488 (3d ed.
1940). See 17 AusT. L.J. 3 (1943). for a full treatment of English and Dominion
rules. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE §§ 214-218 (1942) provide no restriction on spouses'
testimony against each other.
54. "In both civil and criminal proceedings, husband and wife shall be compe-
tent but not compellable to testify for or against each other." 31 STAT. 1358 (1901),
D.C. CODE, § 14-306 (1940).
55. The present rule does not apply where the couple is divorced. Thouvenell
v. Zirbst, 83 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1936), or the husband is charged with bigamy,
24 STAT. 635 (1887), 28 U.S.C. § 633 (1946), repealed, 62 STAT. 862 (1948).
56. 8 WIGMORRE, EVIDENCE § 2383 (3d ed. 1940).
57. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
58. Ibfd. The privilege does not apply to conversations between spouses before
their marriage or after its dissolution.
59. United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943).
60. Note, 35 CORN. L.Q. 187 (1949), discusses observation of the spouse in the
commission of a crime.
61. United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943); 8 WIGBIORE, EVI-
DENCE § 2337 (3d ed. 1940).
62. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
fidential effect to any communications transmitted by a third person, at
least in the absence of necessity for intermediaries in the particular marital
communication.
63
While it is not clear whether marital communications were privileged
at common law,6 4 the question became prominent in England with the
appearance of the Second Report of the Commissioners on Common Law
Procedure in 18S3, proposing the elimination of the general privilege
against spouses testifying adversely, and the substitution of the privilege
against revealing marital confidences.63 In the federal courts, the marital
confidences privilege was introduced as early as 1839 by a Supreme Court
decision, 66 which apparently relied only on a statement in an English
treatise,67 to the effect that a spouse, whose husband is not a defendant,
may not reveal any marital confidences when she is a witness in a trial.
Despite the early beginning of the privilege, it has had very little use, due
to the parallel existence of the general disqualification of the spouse, and
under the present law, the only need for the privilege is to exclude evi-
dence between spouses which cannot be excluded under the general dis-
qualification."s No criminal case has been found in which the courts
have denied the admission of testimony on this ground.
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 69
The attorney-client relationship was the first to be accorded a privi-
lege against disclosure of confidential communications, 70 and it is said
to be the only one presently in existence that has its basis in the common
law. At present it is the subject of legislation in almost all of the com-
mon law jurisdictions except the federal criminal courts.7 ' Originally
the privilege belonged to the lawyer on the theory that as a gentleman
he ought to keep secrets told him in confidence,72 but today it belongs to
63. Ibid. (defendant dictated to stenographer letter intended for wife) ; Dickerson
v. United States, 65 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (letter from husband found among
wife's effects after her death).
64. Compare Shenton v. Tyler, [1939] 1 Ch. 620, 641 (no privilege at common law)
with 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2333 (3d ed. 1940).
65. ComissIONERs ON CommoN LAW PROCEDURE, SECOND REPORT 14 (1853);
see 17 AusT. L.J. 3, 5 (1943).
66. Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209 (U.S. 1839).
67. 2 SHARKIE, EVIDENCE § 709 (1824).
68. The following cases discuss the point: Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S.
1 (1934) ; Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935) ; Frazer v. United
States, 145 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1944) ; Dobbins v. United States, 157 F.2d 257 (D.C.
Cir. 1946).
69. This should be differentiated from the qualification of an attorney engaged
in the trial to testify to any relevant facts which have come to his attention through
sources other than his confidential relationship with his client. The federal courts
do not forbid such testimony, but the practice is not looked upon with favor by
the courts. Steiner v. United States, 134 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1943); Christensen v.
United States, 90 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1937). The suggested practice is that the
lawyer withdraw his participation before he takes the stand. Canon 19 of CANONS
OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF AMERIcAx BAR AsSOcIATION: "When a lawyer is a
witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as attestation or cus-
tody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other
counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testify-
ing in court in behalf of his client." For an excellent discussion of attorney's com-
petency and its ethical problems, see Shirley, Right of Attorney to Participate in Trial
After Testifying for Client, 13 NEB. LAW BuLL. 334 (1935).
70. 8 WIGORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (3d ed. 1940).
71. Id. at § 2292.
72. Radin, Privilege of Confidential Communications Between Lawyer and Client,
16 CAIFI. L. REv. 487 (1928).
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the client and may be waived only by him. It rests basically on a social
policy of encouraging clients to obtain the advice of lawyers and to make
full revelation of facts essential to sound legal advice.
All communications between client and attorney in the course of,
and for the purpose of, professional business for which the latter is en-
gaged are privileged.3 Thus, a client himself cannot be compelled to
disclose those communications which the attorney is precluded from re-
vealing, and the privilege is accorded without regard for the medium of
transmission between the attorney and his client.7 4  While it is not neces-
sary that the remarks have been preceded by a plea of confidence, it is
necessary that it was so understood by the client.75 Therefore, statements
made in the known presence of third persons lose their privileged char-
acter,76 the presumption being conclusive that the communication was
never intended to be confidential. The federal courts go even farther and
permit eavesdroppers to report the communication, 77 even though the
privilege remains as against the lawyer and his client. The exception
has been justified on the ground that since the privilege excludes evidence
which might be valuable in finding the truth, it should be strictly con-
strued to require the client to use great care when disclosing information
to his counsel.
7 8
When a request is made to exclude the testimony of an attorney as
privileged, a question of fact arises as to the existence or prospective
existence of the professional relationship.70 A formal retainer is not
necessary, nor is the promise of payment, actual payment, or the stipula-
tion of a fee essential,80 so long as the communication was made in good
faith for the purpose of obtaining professional advice.81 On the other
hand, an attorney can be required to testify to statements or activities
that are not of a professional nature, such as communications involving
business transactions rather than legal advice.8 2 The disclosure of identity
of the client by the attorney, or the payment of a fee is not accorded the
privilege, unless there is some exceptional circumstance, on the theory
that these matters are seldom considered confidential.88  As an extreme
73. Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1944); York v. United
States, 224 Fed. 88 (8th Cir. 1915).
74. Notes, 88 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 467 (1939); [1943] Wis. L. Rav. 424. The
privilege will usually be accorded to written communications, as well as oral, if they
comply with the other requirements.
75. Hartzell v. United States, 72 F.2d 569 (1934).
76. Livezey v. United States, 279 Fed. 496 (5th Cir. 1922); York v. United
States, 224 Fed. 88 (8th Cir. 1915); Note, 53 A.L.R. 369 (1928) (on who may be
present, without defeating the privilege).
77. United States v. Olmstead, 7 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1925).
78. 8 Wimo, EvIENcE §2326 (3d ed. 1940).
79. Questions of termination and commencement of the relationship are questions
of fact for the court to determine, which appellate courts will hesitate to upset
without a showing of abuse of discretion. Small v. United States, 3 F.2d 101 (7th Cir.
1924); See excellent Note, Nature of Professional Relationship Required Under
Privilege Rule, 24 IowA L. REV. 538 (1939).
80. Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1944); York v. United
States, 224 Fed. 88 (8th Cir. 1915).
81. Disclosures made in good faith during a preliminary interview for the pur-
pose of obtaining professional advice are privileged, even though the employment is
not consummated. Lew Moy v. United States, 237 Fed. 50, 52 (8th Cir. 1916).
82. United States v. Vehicular Parking Limited, 50 F. Supp. 751 (D. Del. 1943).
83. United States v. Lee, 107 Fed. 702 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1901); Tomlinson v.
United States, 93 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ; Kaufman v. United States, 212 Fed.
613 (2d Cir. 1914). But cf. United States v. Pope, 144 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1944).
For an example of the exceptional situation, see Eliot v. United States, 23 App. D.C.
456 (1904).
example, in a White Slave Traffic Act prosecution, the trial court allowed
the government to elicit from an attorney-witness that the accused had
retained him previously to appear for a woman whom the accused was
charged with having transported, in order to impeach the defendant's
testimony that he had no connection with her. The Second Circuit
affirmed the lower court,84 the majority reasoning that the privilege
should be narrowly construed, and that the witness' statement should be
considered merely an identification of a client. The dissent by Judge
Learned Hand contended that such a direction by the client should be
as privileged as any other statements he might make to his attorney,
particularly when it was a step in his own defense.
There is no privilege between attorney and client where the confer-
ences concern the proposed commission of a crime and are had for the
purpose of the attorney's guidance and assistance in such a venture, pro-
vided the defendant is on trial for the very crime concerning which the
statements were made and not for some other offense.8 5 The reason
perhaps most frequently advanced for this policy is that in such cases
there is no professional employment, properly speaking.8 6 Wigmore sug-
gests this exception in view of the fact that the policy of the privilege
ceases when the advice sought concerns future wrongdoing, so that the
attorney may in effect become part of the criminal design.8 7 But the mere
assertion by the prosecution of an intended crime or fraud on the part of
the client will not bring the matter into issue. There must be something
to give color to the charge; there must be prima facie evidence that it has
some foundation in fact.
8 8
JURORS' PRIVILEGE
In the federal courts a juror has a privilege which protects from
exposure his discussion and other considerations which led up to the
determination of the verdict.89  The rule has two foundations. The first
is the public policy which favors independence of thought and will not
permit the stifling of debate in the jury room that might result from a
fear of exposure.90  Another is expressed in the doctrine of Lord Mans-
field that "a witness shall not be heard to allege his own turpitude," 91
enunciated in a case where a juror tried to disclose his own misconduct
during the jury's retirement so as to impeach the verdict rendered. For-
bidding impeachment of the verdict is designed to preclude a disappointed
litigant from harassing the jurors to learn of irregularities in order to
overturn an adverse verdict.
84. United States v. Pope, 144 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1944).
85. Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891); Fuston v. United States,
22 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1927).
86. This view was adopted by the English cases. Queen v. Cox and Railton, 14
Q.B.D. 153, 166-170 (1884) provides the logical exception to Lord Bougnam's state-
ment of the rule of attorney-client privilege in Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 My. & K. 98,
39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch. 1833).
87. 8 WIGmom, EVmENcE § 2298 (3d ed. 1940).
88. SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1948).
89. MacDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); Fabris v. General Foods Corp.,
152 F.2d 660 (1945) ; Yoong v. United States, 163 F.2d 187 (10th Cir. 1947). But
cf. United States v. Pleva, 66 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1933) (verdict impeached by state-
ments of juror in open court, before recording of verdict, showing verdict result of
coercion).
90. This policy has its beginning in Bushnell's Case, Vaughn 135, 124 Eng. Rep.
1006 (1670), discussed in the Clark case, note 92 infra.
91. Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785) ("Nemo turpi-
tudinem suam allegans audietur.").
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The public policy advanced for the privilege conflicts with another
important social consideration when there has been fraud in connection
with the jury. In Clark v. United States,92 the Supreme Court, balancing
the two interests, decided that the integrity of the jury was of greater
social importance than keeping the privilege intact. Justice Cardozo
limited the scope of the privilege by holding it not applicable where the
relation out of which it arose had been fraudulently begun or continued.
The attorney-client relation was applied by the Court, by way of analogy,
in the Clark case. Just as that privilege vanishes when the actors abuse
the relation by planning a crime, so the juror's privilege disappears when
he has become a juror in the case through fraud. Likewise, the privilege
is not denied until a prima facie case has been made out by the party
seeking to attack it,9 3 and evidence may be sought by invasions of the
jury room only to corroborate a case already made likely. In the Clark
case, for example, the juror's crime did not depend upon his conduct in
the jury room, but was completed by perjury on his voir dire with intent
to obstruct justice. If the juror has honestly created his relationship to
the case, he can claim the full extent of his privilege. The Clark situation
may be compared to the rule that in order for the privilege against dis-
closure of marital communications to arise, there must have been a valid
marriage between the parties. Where the marriage is void, 94 there is no
privilege.
GOVERNMENTAL PRIVILEGES
Informers' Privilege.-Traditionally at common law communications
made to the government by informers concerning the commission of
crimes were protected by a privilege based on the importance of the
detection of crime.95 The rationale of the privilege is that informers will
be deterred from aiding law enforcement authorities if their identity is
disclosed, because of fear of retribution and because of impairment of
their existing sources of information.9" The most frequent situation in
which the defendant's case requires disclosure of the basis of a govern-
ment witness' testimony is that in which he is attempting to show that
a government officer obtained incriminating evidence through an illegal
search and seizure. Where the arrest has been made without a warrant,
the testimony of the informer may be desirable to enable the defendant
to prove the non-existence of a reasonable belief in the commission of the
crime. Where a warrant has been sworn out, the testimony may establish
the non-existence of probable cause for its issuance. Although the gen-
eral rule has been that only the identity of the informer will be withheld,97
it has been stated that the whole communication is privileged.9 8  The
privilege extends to the identity of informers aiding investigating officers
as well as arresting officers. 99
92. 289 U.S. 1 (1933), 81 U. oF PA. L. Rzv. 1000 (1933).
93. Cases cited id. at 15.
94. Cole v. Cole, 153 Ill. 585, 38 N.E. 703 (1894).
95. 8 WIGORF., EvIDENcE § 2374 (3d ed. 1940).
96. Wilson v. United States, 59 F2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932) ; United States v. Li
Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Nichols, 78 F. Supp. 483
(W.D. Ark. 1948).
97. Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884); In re Quarle and Butler, 158 U.S.
532 (1895).
98. See Arnstein v. United States, 296 Fed. 946, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
99. Schier v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Mitrovitch v. United States,
15 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1926); Goetz v. United States, 39 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1930).
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A significant limitation upon the privilege is the power of the trial
court to deny it where the identity of the informer or his testimony is
important to vindicate the accused, or to lessen the risk of false testimony,
or is otherwise essential to the proper disposition of the case. 100 It cannot
be said that the privilege is one exclusively of the government or of the
communicant, or even a privilege of both, for the informer waives it when
he appears and the defendant may compel disclosure.101
Two cases, recently decided, raise a problem close to the informer's
privilege. The issue generally in both is whether or not an accused has
the right to inspect prior voluntary statements made by a witness to the
prosecution, and in its hands, but of which the latter has made no use
during the trial. This problem is not solved by Rule 16, providing for
discovery and inspection of certain papers in the hands of the govern-
ment, since the right given by the rule applies only to papers obtained
from witnesses by seizure or process.
10 2
In the first case, United States v. Krulewitch,0 3 the defendant at-
tempted to obtain the prior inconsistent statements of the witness which
completely exculpated the accused, to add to the impeachment of her
testimony for the government, even though the witness had sworn on the
stand that the prior statement was false. The Second Circuit held that
even if the statement constituted a privileged communication, the prosecu-
tion surrendered the privilege when it called the witness to the stand, so
that denial of inspection constituted reversible error. Judge Clark dis-
sented on the ground that requiring the prosecution to hand over its own
witness' statement, of which it had made no use, was contrary to estab-
lished precedent, and that the majority had gone too far in not leaving it
to the discretion of the trial judge.10 4  Shortly after this case, the same
court decided United States v. Eberling 105 in which Judge Clark wrote
the majority opinion. In that case the court found no error in the refusal
of the trial judge to allow inspection of a report made to an FBI agent
by a witness for the prosecution. Since the report was not shown to
contradict the witness' testimony on the stand and was not made part of
the record on appeal, the court held the Krulewitch case did not govern.
Judge Frank dissented on the ground that the Krulewitch decision was
controlling. 10 6 Although the conclusion to be drawn from these two cases
does not appear to be very clear, it seems that the courts will merely de-
termine whether prior voluntary statements of government witnesses are
relevant to the case, and deny suppression if they are.10 7 The question
whether the statements are privileged on such other grounds as informer's
confidential communications fails to arise because the communicant has
100. Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932) ; Segurola v. United
States, 16 F.2d 563, 565 (1st Cir. 1926); Shore v. United States, 49 F.2d 519, 522
(D.C. Cir. 1931) ; Mclwes v. United States, 62 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1932).
101. See In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532, 536 (1894) ; Arnstein v. United
States, 296 Fed. 946, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
102. Rule 16, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: "Upon motion of
a defendant . . . the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the
defendant to inspect and copy and photograph designated books, papers, documents,
or, tangible objects obtained from or belonging to the defe7idant or attained from
others by seizure or by process. . . ." (Emphasis added.) But cf. Shores v.
United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949).
103. 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944).
104. Id. at 80.
105. 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944).
106. Id. at 257.
107. United States v. Winters, 158 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1946).
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waived any privilege by his appearance as a witness.' 08 Since the duty
of the prosecution is to acquit the innocent as well as to convict the guilty,
it is submitted that as much of the facts as possible should be presented
to the jury, and the prosecution should not be permitted to suppress facts
which may aid the jury in its determination of the veracity of the wit-
nesses before it.
Statutory Administrative Privileges.-Many federal statutes, and de-
partmental regulations promulgated pursuant to a general delegation of
authority therefor,10 9 specifically forbid disclosure of information which
has been acquired by officials or agents under some compulsory process."
0
These regulations have been held to have the force of law.:" This form
of privilege is particularly directed toward nondisclosure of governmental
information in controversies between private litigants, according to one
line of cases, and is not available to the United States in a criminal prose-
cution founded upon such information." 2  Unless some public policy such
as a security need is present in a particular case, the United States or one
of its agents, when either is a party to a case, cannot invoke the privilege.
An opposite view has been taken in several cases decided prior to the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. These de-
cisions, relying on the language of the statutes which created the privilege,
hold that the status of the parties is immaterial to its application."
3 Rule
16 would appear to have strengthened the former line of authority, since
it is an explicit and later rule of law which provides the right of discovery
to the defendant in a criminal case."
4
CONCLUSION
Examination of this limited field has shown little to be objectionable
in the law that is now applied by the federal criminal courts. In most
instances the courts have taken the most enlightened view. This appears
to be borne out by the fact that very few problems have been raised in
recent cases as to competency and privileged communications. As a
result, the law in most of the field appears to be pellucid. For this reason
it would be unadvisable for the federal courts to adopt an extensive codifi-
cation of the evidence to be used in criminal cases. Rule 26 seems more
suitable for retaining the certainty of the law that presently exists, since
codification would require the courts to undertake interpretation, which
might cause confusion, until a final meaning was given to the code. In
addition, the flexibility of Rule 26 allows the courts to be progressive in
their rulings and to reflect the most modern views on the subject.
108. United States v. Krulewitch, note 103 supra at 79.
109. REv. STAT. § 161 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1946), authorizes the heads of
governmental departments to prescribe regulations not inconsistent with law for cus-
tody, use and preservation of documents and information relating to the department.
110. Note, 165 A.L.R. 1302 (1946).
111. United States v. Marino, 141 F.2d 771 (2d Cir. 1944).
112. Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528 (N.D Il. 1942); Brewer v. Hassett, 2 F.R.D.
222 (D. Mass. 1942).
113. United States v. Potts, 57 F. Supp. 204 (M.D. Pa. 1944) ; Walling v. Comet
Carriers, 3 F.R.D. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
114. See note 106 supra for text of the Rule. A restrictive interpretation of the
Rule is announced in United States v. Black, 6 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ind. 1946), where
defendants' motion to inspect statements made to government agents after the com-
mission of the alleged crime was denied on the ground that the Rule "embraces only
those documents and objects which were in existence and in the custody of a de-
fendant or other person prior to the government's obtainment of them by process or
seizure."
The only problem that appears to be in need of consideration is the
one concerned with marital relations. The need for protection of marital
harmony seems to be a little overdone in the federal courts, in view of
the provision for two co-existent methods of excluding evidence for that
purpose. A satisfactory result would be reached if only one were per-
mitted. 15 Since the privilege protecting marital communications is predi-
cated on a firmer basis and seems more consistent with the conditions of
modem society, that should be adopted by the federal courts to the denial
of the other. This task is one for the Supreme Court, and could rightly
be accomplished by judicial decision within the framework of Rule 26.
Such a step would certainly fulfill the intention of the draftsmen that the
Rules in use should be "continuously creative in an exceptionally high
degree." 116
P.L.J.
Pennsylvania Certiorari and Review of Questions of Law
Although much can be said in favor of limited appellate review of
administrative decisions, there is little to recommend the present con-
fusion as to the scope of such review in Pennsylvania. This confusion is
apparently a hangover from the great procedural diversity in Pennsyl-
vania's administrative agencies prior to the passage of the Administrative
Agency Law in 1945.1 Approximately thirty different agencies affecting
private rights had each possessed their own adjudicative procedures, which
were subject to review to various extents by the Common Pleas or Quar-
ter Sessions courts.2  Review of the lower court decisions by appellate
courts was sometimes expressly provided or denied, sometimes not men-
tioned. The Administrative Agency Law purports to standardize the
review procedure of all the agencies within its scope by providing for an
appeal from agency adjudications to the Court of Common Pleas of
Dauphin County, and an appeal from that court "to the Superior or
Supreme Court as in other cases." 3 This provision appears to allow the
two appellate courts to review lower court decisions on an appeal in the
nature of a writ of error, although the few cases decided under it are not
clear on the question.4  However, at the insistence of the agencies in-
115. COMMISSIONERS ON COMMON LAw PROCEDURE, SECOND REPORT 14 (1853);
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942) adopts this view.
116. Orfield, Two Years of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 21 TEmP. L.Q.
299 n.179 (1948).
1. Act of June 4, 1945, P.L. 1388, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 71, § 1710 (Purdon, Supp.
1949).
2. Report of the Administrative Law Committee, 40 PENNA. B.A.Q. 273 (1939)
Faught, The Multiplication of Administrative Agencies and Problems of Judicial Re-
v7ew in Pennsylvania, 13 TEinP. L.Q. 30 (1938).
3. Act of June 4, 1945, P.L. 1388, §§ 41, 45, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 71, §§ 1710.41,
1710.45 (Purdon, Supp. 1949).
4. The writ of error has always been the proper form of review of proceedings
according to the common law. "Appeal . . . as in other cases" would thus seem to
indicate this form of review. Compare Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Thoburn, 7 S. &
R. 411 (Pa. 1821) with Rand v. King, 134 Pa. 641 (1890). In Pennsylvania State
Board of Medical Education v. Shireson, 360 Pa. 129 (1948), an appeal under the Ad-
ministrative Agency Law, the court reviewed questions of law without mentioning the
scope of the appeal. However, in State Civil Service Commission v. Swann, 362 Pa.
422 (1949), the court stated that § 44 of the Administrative Agency Law, which deals
with the scope of review of the trial court, applied to the appellate court, so that the
latter could only reverse the decision below for lack of substantial evidence or viola-
tion of constitutional rights.
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volved,5 the effectiveness of the act was greatly diminished by a provision
exempting from it all agency adjudications from which appeal to a court
had been expressly provided or denied by statute.6  Appeal to a Common
Pleas court is thus not always available. Confusion also exists as to the
scope of an ensuing review by an appellate court. It has been held that
such review can only take the form of an appeal in the nature of a
certiorari.
7
Such an appeal is the only proper method of review of habeas corpus
decisions, and of election cases, in which lower courts exercise quasi-
administrative functions. It is the purpose of this Note to analyze some
of the conflicting decisions on the scope of certiorari in all these fields,
for the uncertainty on the subject in appeals from administrative decisions
also exists in other areas covered by the writ.
CERTIORARI IN THE PENNSYLVANIA APPELLATE SYSTEM
The place of certiorari in the Pennsylvania appellate review system
is obscure as a result of the passage and interpretation of an act of 1889
vhich provided that thereafter all review proceedings would be taken
"in a proceeding to be called an appeal." s This language was immedi-
ately interpreted by the Supreme Court as changing the writ of error, the
appeal, and the writ of certiorari in name only, leaving them applicable
in the same instances, and unchanged in nature and scope. Thus, though
any of the three procedures used for review of a lower tribunal's decision
is called an appeal, the nature and extent of that appeal is determined by
the common law rules governing the form which review of the decision
is to take.' 0 If these rules indicate that an appeal in the equity sense is
available, the entire proceeding below will be considered and disposed of
as justice requires." If a writ of error is the proper form, all decisions
of law excepted to below are reviewable, but decisions of fact are not.12
And if only a certiorari lies, the appellant may find that his "appeal"
amounts to no more than a determination that the lower court proceeded
regularly, and had jurisdiction of the controversy.' 8 The rules deter-
mining when the appeal will be in the nature of a certiorari, and what
the scope of such an appeal will be have early common law origins. A
brief history of the writ is thus necessary to an understanding of the
appellate courts' treatment of it today.'
4
5. 52 PENNA. B.A. REP. 179, 181 (1946).
6. Act of June 4, 1945, P.L. 1388, § 51, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 71, § 1710.51 (Pur-
don, Supp. 1949).
7. Commonwealth v. Nathans, 5 Barr. 124 (Pa. 1847) ; Commonwealth v. Beau-
mont, 4 Rawle 368 (Pa. 1834).
8. Act of May 9, 1889, P.L. 158, § 1, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 1131 (Purdon,
1931).
9. Christner v. John, 171 Pa. 527, 529 (1895). See also Supreme Court Order,
131 Pa. xxi (1890) recommending its repeal.
10. Rand v. King, 134 Pa. 641 (1890).
11. Esakovich v. Groudine, 141 Pa. Super. 365 (1940).
12. Warsaw Township v. Know Township, 107 Pa. 301 (1884).
13. Grime v. Dep't of Public Instruction, 324 Pa. 371 (1936).
14. Certiorari had three distinct uses: (a) to remove causes before judgment
when it appeared that a fair trial could not be had below, (b) to bring up from the
lower court any omissions from the record (certiorari stir diminution of the record),
and (c) to review a lower court determination after judgment. Goodnow, The Writ
of Certiorari, 6 POL. Sc. Q. 493, 500 (1891). This paper will deal only with the writ
as used to review a lower court determination in a civil case after judgment-in short,
as a means of review in the usual sense.
Development of the Writ.-Certiorari was first used by the Norman
kings of England as a means of strengthening their control over the pre-
viously autonomous Teutonic popular courts,15 and although issued by
all three main branches of the King's Courts,16 it was apparently made
most use of by the King's Bench as a means of supervising the actions
of lower court officers."' Thus from the beginning it differed from appeal
and the writ of error in that it was primarily used as a means of control
of the actions of lower courts, rather than as a method of reviewing
adverse decisions. This difference was emphasized by the fact that it was
not a writ of right, but issued only at the pleasure of the higher courts.' 8
It was also early decided that certiorari would not be issued where an
equity appeal was possible, on the grounds that its use would block this
right to a fuller review.19 The same reason was apparently applied with
respect to proceedings according to the common law in courts of record
where the losing party was entitled to a writ of error. The result was
that certiorari was used to review decisions only where no other method
was possible, the great majority of such instances being administrative
decisions of Justices of the Peace and of various governing bodies created
by statute or royal command 2 0
The scope of the writ of certiorari was originally limited in most
types of cases to review of questions of law, 21 and by the beginning of the
eighteenth century it had been narrowed to the questions of the jurisdic-
tion of the lower court and the regularity of its proceedings. This ex-
treme restriction on its scope resulted from the argument that no review
of any kind should be allowed from administrative proceedings, since
they were not a part of the common law court system. In answer, the
Kings Bench stated that, as administrator of the King's justice, it had
supervisory control over all its officers, and could at least issue certiorari
to make sure that they acted regularly and within the limits of the power
conferred upon them.22 This could be done from an examination of the
record alone, without pleadings, evidence, or the opinion; hence the rule
that certiorari brings up the record only.23
This extremely narrow form of review, issuing at the discretion of
the appellate court, and only when other forms are not available, was
adopted by Pennsylvania as part of the common law.24 As a means of
review in the administrative field and in other areas where neither the
writ of error nor the appeal were available, it was inadequate in its orig-
inal form, and in consequence is still undergoing modification. The change
15. Id. at 493.
16. 1 TirD, PRACTICE 397 (3d Am. ed. 1840).
17. 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAv 93 (2d ed. 1924) states that it is-
sued only from the King's Bench and Chancery.
18. Appeal of Philadelphia College of Law, Inc., 54 D. & C. 287, 290 (Pa. C.P.
1945).
19. Regula Generalis, 1 Salkeld 147, 91 Eng. Rep. 136 (K.B. 1702); 2 BACON,
ABRIDGMENT 165 (ann. Am. ed. 1860).
20. 2 BAcON, ABRIDGMENT 167 (ann. Am. ed. 1860).
21. Goodnow, supra note 14, at 499.
22. Groenwalt v. Burwell, 1 Salkeld 144, 91 Eng. Rep. 134 (K.B. 1701).
23. Ibid.
24. The Supreme Court was invested with all the powers of the Kings Bench
by an Act of 1722, and the first Pennsylvania Constitution reaffirmed this grant of
power. Commonwealth v. Beaumont, 4 Rawle 368 (Pa. 1834). As to its character
and scope in early Pennsylvania, see Gosline v. Place, 32 Pa. 520, 526 (1859) ; Com-
monwealth v. Nathans, 5 Barr 124 (Pa. 1847); Commonwealth v. McGinnis, 2 Whar-
ton 113 (Pa. 1837).
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is taking place piecemeal, with a resulting uncertainty of the law governing
application of the writ.
Its prerogative nature was the first characteristic to disappear. Al-
though one or two very early Pennsylvania decisions mention it as issuing
only in the discretion of the appellate court, the vast majority of cases
indicate that it issues as a matter of course. 25  As has been mentioned
previously, it is now called an appeal in the nature of a certiorari. 26 An
act of 1919 directs that all evidence taken in the court below should be
made a part of the record on certiorari, 27 thus giving the appellate court
more information on which to act. As will be shown later, court decisions
had already added the lower tribunal's opinion to the record. The greatest
change has been an expansion of the scope of this form of appeal by the
Supreme and Superior Courts in their struggle to fashion from it an
effective review of the merits of administrative decisions. Since this has
been done in the face of the rule that the only questions open to the court
are the jurisdiction of the lower tribunal and the regularity of its pro-
ceedings, conflicting decisions on the subject are common.
28
An attempt to reconcile such decisions was first made in 1924 by the
Supreme Court in Twenty-First Senatorial District Nomination: 
29
"Where, in a statutory proceeding, the legislature fails to provide
for an appeal, and because of that omission, the action of the tribunal
involved is . . . considered final . . ., a certiorari to inspect the
record in the broadest sense allowed by our cases, may nevertheless
issue; but where the legislature . . . particularly states that no appeal
shall be permitted, then review, beyond determining questions of
jurisdiction, cannot be had."
The distinction was followed in later opinions,3 0 and led to the general
rule in force when the Administrative Agency Law was passed, that
certiorari to review questions of law may only be had where the proceed-
ings below were statutory, and the statute did not mention appeal.31 Since
all administrative adjudications under statutes silent on appeal are now
subject to review by virtue of the new statute,31 this part of the court rule
has in effect been adopted by the legislature.
The rule that, where the legislature forbids appeal, only the question
of jurisdiction of the lower court may be considered on review is still
adhered to but has proven inadequate in two respects. First, it does not
explain recurring inconsistencies on the subject in recent decisions. As
illustration, in Bauman Election Case,32 under a statute forbidding appeal,
the Supreme Court reversed the Common Pleas of Allegheny County on
25. See Note, 78 U. oF PA. L. REv. 232, 233 (1929). In the federal review sys-
tem, as well as in other states where a principal function of the highest appellate court
is the coordination of the law in decisions of the intermediate tribunals, the writ re-
mains a prerogative one in order that the highest court may better limit itself to this
function.
26. See note 8 supra.
27. Act of April 19, 1919, P.L. 72, PA. STAT. ANx., tit. 12, § 1165 (Purdon, 1931).
28. For collection of the cases, see Rimer's Contested Election, 316 Pa. 342 (1934).
29. 281 Pa. 273, 279 (1924).
30. White Township School Director's Appeal, 300 Pa. 422 (1930) (explanation
of legislature's limited right to curtail appellate jurisdiction) ; Rimer's Contested
Election, 316 Pa. 342 (1934).
31. Kaufman Const. Co. v. Holcomb, 357 Pa. 514, 519 (1947); Commonwealth
v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 475 (1939) ; Elkland Leather Workers' Ass'n, Inc., 330 Pa. 78
(1938).
31a. For the scope of this review, see note 4 supra.
32. 351 Pa. 451 (1945).
the question of what constitutes an invalid election ballot as described by
statute, though this was obviously a question of substantive law. Clearly
the rule outlined above was not followed. When the Bauman case was
cited a year later in Blair Liquor License Case 3 3 as irdicating that deci-
sions on questions of law are reviewable on certiorari even though the
governing statute forbids appeal, the Superior Court answered:
"The Bauman case is an example of the broad . . . type of
certiorari. It is one of a long line of cases, some of which are cited
in the opinion, in which the Supreme Court upon certiorari has con-
sidered more than the question of jurisdiction and the regularity of
the proceeding, and has held: '. . . in this class of cases (Mostly
election cases), in passing on the regularity of the record, findings of
fact contained in the opinion of the court below may be considered so
far as they concern fundamental questions . . .'" 4
It is apparent that the Superior Court at least is not classifying its cases
in accordance with the rule under discussion.
Secondly, the rule applies to certiorari only when it is used as an
appeal from statutory proceedings. Although this is its most frequent
use, certain other decisions, notably orders disposing of habeas corpus
hearings, are reviewable only by appeal in the nature of certiorari. The
extent of review available from such proceedings is thus indefinite, al-
though the Supreme Court in discussing the question has not distinguished
between adjudications governed by statute and those which are not, citing
the former as authority in limiting the scope of review in the latter. 5
The remainder of this Note will be devoted to an examination of the
cases involving certiorari in an attempt to arrive at a picture of its scope.
Such an analysis of frequently cited cases should prove useful to those
contemplating appeal, and will serve to clarify the present confusion sur-
rounding the rule enunciated by the courts. The expansion of certiorari
to include questions of substantive law will first be traced as it took place
in election cases. A series of liquor license cases under a statute for-
bidding appeal in part, and silent in part, will then be considered. Finally,
certiorari to review habeas corpus hearings concerning extradition of
fugitives will be discussed as an example of the use of this means of appeal
in the absence of statute.
BROAD CERTIORARI IN ELECTION CASES
As early as 1839 the legislature had empowered the Common Pleas
Court of each county to investigate election disputes, and decide finally
which of the contestants had been elected.3 6 In Carpenter's Case,37 de-
cided in 1850 and still cited as authority, the Supreme Court stated simply
that even its inherent supervisory power to correct jurisdictional mistakes
by writ of certiorari was constitutionally taken away when the legislature
provided that the Common Pleas decision in such cases be final. Another
33. 158 Pa. Super. 365, 369 (1946).
34. Italics supplied by the Superior Court. It should be noted for the sake of
clarity that consideration of findings of fact is not the same as review of conclusions
of law. Nor does the case from which this language is taken, Smith's Petition, 292
Pa. 140 (1928), contribute to an understanding of the problem of when questions of
law are reviewable on certiorari.
35. Commonwealth ex rel. Mattox v. Supt. Co. Prison, 152 Pa. Super. 167 (1943);
Fleming v. Prospect Park Board, 318 Pa. 582 (1935).
36. Act of July 2, 1839, § 5, since repealed.
37. 14 Pa. 486 (1850).
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election decision of the same year under a statute silent on the question of
appeal stated that, though no legislative restriction existed, certiorari was
confined to the questions of jurisdiction and regularity whenever the lower
court was acting on a matter specially delegated to it by statute.8  Use
of certiorari to review election disputes was thus originally no different
from its use in other situations. However, the decision in Carpenter's
Case was very soon misinterpreted to read that, regardless of the words
of the statute, certiorari lay to review the jurisdiction of the lower court
and the regularity of its proceedings.3 9 The writ existed in this single
form 40 until 1898 when the court, in Nomination Certificate of John S.
Robb,1 ruled that the opinion might be examined along with the record,
but only for the purpose of decidiag the two questions open to it on cer-
tiorari. This practice was justified in Independence Party Nomination 42
on the grounds that in equity the appellate court may always examine
the reasons behind the decisions below, and that since election petitions,
as summary proceedings, were partially equitable, the opinion might ac-
company the record. Thus certiorari in election cases was for the first
time altered, although its scope remained the same. However, the step
from mere examination of the opinion in order to ascertain the basis of
the court's decision to reversal of the judgment because of a misapplication
of legal principles, as disclosed by the opinion, is almost imperceptible.
It was accomplished in Krickbaum's Contested Election,43 in which the
Supreme Court not only reversed the Quarter Sessions on the merits,
but gave as its reason that the lower court had erred in deciding a ques-
tion of fact!
Thus certiorari had been expanded to afford as complete a review
as the equity appeal, since the appellate court might attack any lower
court ruling, whether excepted to or not, and might reverse it on a ques-
tion of fact. The broad form of Pennsylvania certiorari is an outgrowth
of this group of election cases. Although all reviewed questions of fact
and law only on the grounds that election proceedings were partially
equitable in nature, they have nevertheless been cited in other cases in-
volving non-equitable lower court proceedings as authority for review of
the merits under certiorari. 44
THE Two FORMS OF CERTIORARI IN LIQUOR LICENSE CASES
Appeals from decisions involving the issuance of liquor licenses have
best illustrated the distinction on review between statutes expressly pro-
38. Wallington v. Kneass, 15 Pa. 313 (1850), citing Commonwealth v. Nathans,
5 Barr 124 (Pa. 1847).
39. Chase v. Miller, 41 Pa. 403 (1862), where it was held that the only obstacle
to review of questions of law on certiorari was that the bare record alone was brought
up, but that since in that particular case the evidence and opinion had been made part
of the record, the lower court's conclusions of law could be reviewed.
40. Election Cases, 65 Pa. 20 (1870).
41. 188 Pa. 212 (1898).
42. 208 Pa. 108 (1904). See also Chester County Republican Nomination, 213
Pa. 64 (1905), and Foy's Election, 228 Pa. 14, 16 (1910) where, after stating that
the evidence and the opinion might be reviewed, the court justifies its consideration of
the questions of law with the comment, "Wherever the right to review exists, the
power to correct follows as a necessary corollary."
43. 221 Pa. 521 (1908).
44. Twenty-first Senatorial District Nomination, 281 Pa. 273, 279 (1934) ; Rimer's
Contested Election, 316 Pa. 342 (1934) ; It re Elkland Leather Workers' Ass'n, 330
Pa. 78 (1938) ; Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469 (1939) ; Kaufman Construction
Co. v. Holcomb, 357 Pa. 514, 519 (1947). A few election decisions have asserted the
narrow certiorari rule; Twenty-eighth Congressional District Nomination, 268 Pa. 313,
321 (1920) ; Cramer's Election Case, 248 Pa. 208 (1915).
hibiting appeal and those silent on the subject. Laws governing the sale
of liquor have traditionally given the Quarter Sessions Court, or an ad-
ministrative board or officer, authority to license liquor vendors. 45 Re-
view of the licensing decisions was usually had by a petition to the
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel granting of the license 46
until the decision in Johnson's Case, in 1894, in which the Supreme Court
held that mandamus was not a proper writ for review, and suggested use
of certiorari to reach abuse of discretion by the licensing court.4 7 Appeal
in the nature of certiorari was used three years later in the Donaghue
case, the Superior Court stating that, since the Quarter Sessions Court
was exercising jurisdiction committed to it by statute, certiorari was the
correct form of appeal, and its scope was limited to a determination that
the lower court had kept within the limits of its powers, and had acted
regularly, without abuse of its discretion.48 But the court was met im-
mediately by the difficulty that the record did not include either the evi-
dence or the lower court's opinion, and that without these a decision on
the questions open to it was impossible. Rather than have "a Quarter
Sessions judge . . . sit as absolute a despot as the Emperor of China," 49
the court reviewed the evidence and the opinion as certified to it by the
Quarter Sessions, and decided that the lower court had abused its dis-
cretion in granting a license for the previous year in exchange for the
licensee's promise not to apply for one the following year. Thus strict
common law certiorari was from the beginning modified to provide more
adequate review.
The Act of 1933, instituted following repeal, vested power to revoke
liquor licenses in the courts of Quarter Sessions, and provided that "The
action of the court . . . shall be final." 50 The legislature thus for the
first time limited appeal in this situation, and unless its members were
entirely unfamiliar with the form taken by appeal from proceedings not
according to the common law, they must have intended to prohibit the
limited certiorari allowed by the Donaghue case.51 In dealing with this
restriction the Superior Court in Revocation of Mark's License 52 stated
that although a common law appeal was prohibited,
"'. .. an appeal in the nature of a 'certiorari' will lie, notwithstanding
the provision above quoted in order that this court under its general
supervisory powers on certiorari, may . . . ascertain whether the
court below exceeded its jurisdiction or its proper legal discre-
tion . . ." 53
It then added that by virtue of the act of 1919,54 it could also examine
the evidence to test the right of the court to make the order complained
of. Since this was the extent of certiorari in the Donaghue case prior to
45. Schlaudecker v. Marshall, 72 Pa. 200 (1872).
46. Raudenbusch's Petition, 120 Pa. 328 (1888).
47. 165 Pa. 315, 325 (1894).
48. Donaghue's License, 5 Pa. Super. 1 (1897).
49. Id. at 12, quoting Chief Justice Paxson in Prospect Brewing Co.'s Petition,
127 Pa. 523 (1889), a similar situation.
50. Act of Dec. 20, 1933, P.L. 75, § 13, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 47, § 744-410 (Pur-
don, 1941).
51. See Twenty-first Senatorial District Nomination. 281 Pa. 273, 277 (1924)
(court's surmise as to the meaning of "appeal" in such statutes).
52. 115 Pa. Super. 256 (1934).
53. Id. at 263.
54. Act of April 19, 1919, P.L. 72, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 1165 (Purdon, 1931).
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the legislative restriction, the court had in effect ignored the restriction
completely.
Amendments to the statute in 1935 and 1937 55 placed the power to
issue, transfer, and revoke licenses in the Liquor Control Board. A
method of appeal to the Quarter Sessions court on refusal to issue or
transfer a license was provided, and "no further appeal" was allowed the
applicant. 56 A subsequent section of the act reiterated that upon refusal
of the Board to transfer a license, the aggrieved party might appeal "in
the same manner" as from a refusal to issue a license,5 7 and again it was
provided that the Quarter Sessions decision should be final. A similar
provision for appeal was made in the case of the revocation of a license,
but there was no statement that the Quarter Sessions decision 58 should
be final. Grasping at this omission, the Superior Court held in Common-
wealth v. Hildebrande that in revocation cases review in the nature of a
broad certiorari was allowable, and that it could therefore reverse the
Quarter Sessions on an error of law.59 Thus by virtue of the omission
of a restriction on appeal, certiorari to review an administrative deter-
mination had reached the stature of a common law writ of error. The
opinion points out, however, that more extensive property rights are dis-
turbed by revocation of a license than by refusal to issue one, and that
there is therefore good reason for allowing broad review of the former
but not of the latter.
This progressive trend toward a broad review whenever possible has
been interrupted by the 1949 amendment to the Liquor Control Act which
provides for an appeal to the Superior Court from any licensing decision
of a trial court.60 The distinction on appeal between granting, trans-
ferring, and revoking licenses is thus apparently abolished. At this writ-
ing no cases involving the provision have been reported, and consequently
the scope of this new appeal is uncertain. However, since the statute
expressly gives the lower court a broad review, there is less likelihood
that the Superior Court will make its review as narrow as has the Supreme
Court in proceedings under the Administrative Agency Law.0 1
REVIEW OF HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
Pennsylvania courts side with the majority of American jurisdictions
in denying an appeal from habeas corpus proceedings, and allowing the
relator to petition for another writ in a different court instead.6 2 Conse-
quently review of such proceedings is limited to that afforded by appeal
in the nature of certiorari :63 to a determination that the lower court had
jurisdiction of the controversy and proceeded in a regular manner.
When the hearing involves extradition, consideration of questions on
certiorari is at any rate limited by the narrow function of the lower court
in such proceedings. Thus in Commonwealth ex rel. Flower v. Supt. Co.
55. Act of July 18, 1935, P.L. 1246, Act of June 16, 1937, P.L. 1762, PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 47, §§ 744-201, -404, -408, -410 (Purdon, 1941).
56. § 744-404.
57. § 744-408.
58. § 744-410.
59. Commonwealth v. Hildebrande, 139 Pa. Super. 304 (1939).
60. Act of May 20, 1949, P.L. 1551, §§ 2-4, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 47, §§ 744-404,
-408, -410 (Purdon, Supp. 1949).
61. See Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases cited note 4 supra.
62. CHURCH, WRrT OF HABEAS CORUS, § 389e (1893); Commonwealth ex rel.
Mattox v. Supt. Co. Prison, 152 Pa. Super. 167, 170 (1943).
63. Commonwealth v. McDougall, 203 Pa. 291 (1902), cited for this restriction
by Commonwealth v. Hare, 36 Pa. Super. 125, 129 (1908).
Prison 64 a United States Supreme Court decision is cited confining the
lower court to identification of the person demanded, and decision from
the record that a crime was substantially charged in the demanding state,
and that the relator was a fugitive from justice.6 5 Both the Flower de-
cision and one by the Superior Court in the same year 66 limit the scope
of appeal to a narrow certiorari, leaving the legality of the extradition
proceedings as tested by the three considerations mentioned above solely
in the discretion of the lower court.
Subsequent decisions, however, reflect the same ragged progress
towards a broad review as is seen in other fields. The Superior Court in
Commonwealth v. Steele 67 completely ignored the careful distinction made
by the Flower decision between the questions before the lower court and
those open to the appellate court on certiorari, and, while citing the earlier
case as controlling, went on to affirm lower court rulings that certain
evidence was admissible and that the relator's contention that his sentence
in the demanding state had been suspended was not a proper reason for
denying extradition. The effect of the decision was thus to allow the
appellate court on certiorari to review any determinations of law made
below.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Mattox v. Supt. Co. Prison 68 the Superior
Court again stated that its review was limited to a narrow certiorari. With
this flat ruling as preface, it then affirmed the lower court's decision on a
question of pure substantive law: that the danger of mob violence in the
demanding state is sufficient reason for releasing the relator on habeas
corpus.69  Three years later in Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Dye 70
the Mattox case was cited for the proposition that the only question before
the appellate court was whether there had been an abuse of discretion
below in the disregard of substantial evidence. On this pretext it was
decided that Johnson was properly convicted of murder in the demanding
state, since a demurrer to the evidence in the murder trial would have
been of no avail, and that the relator's stories of false testimony against
him and of brutal treatment while imprisoned, were not credible. The
Mattox case received yet another interpretation in 1949 in Commonwealth
ex rel. Ghezzi v. Jeffries.71 Counsel in that case contended that the
Mattox decision allows review in the nature of a broad certiorari in extra-
dition cases. The court denied any such interpretation and stated that
• . the court on review may only determine whether or not the lower
court proceeded in conformity with the law in deciding . . ." the legality
of the proceedings. 72 It then proceeded by footnote to explain that an
exception to this limitation of review exists where, as in the Mattox case,
there was evidence that the relator would be subjected to mob violence if
extradited.
There has thus been a return to the rule of the Flower case, but with
the exception noted above. Unusual circumstances in the demanding
64. 220 Pa. 401 (1908).
65. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885).
66. Commonvealth v. Hare, 36 Pa. Super. 125 (1908).
67. 78 Pa. Super. 352 (1922).
68. 152 Pa. Super. 167 (1943).
69. For comment on this use of habeas corpus, see Notes, 17 TEMP. L.Q. 469
(1943) ; 53 YALE L.J. 359 (1944).
70. 159 Pa. Super. 542, 548 (1946).
71. 164 Pa. Super. 48 (1949).
72. Id. at 52.
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state, such as were suspected in both the Mattox and Johnson decisions,
may justify expansion of the scope of the hearing below.73 At any rate,
when such an important question as the liberty of the relator is at stake,
review of the principles of law used in the exercise of this expanded scope
is desirable in order that the new law as applied by the many lower
tribunals may be uniform. Moreover, appellate review of questions of
law involving extradition is reached more easily under narrow certiorari
since the substantive questions involved in extradition principally concern
whether the jurisdiction of the lower court extends to a consideration of
events in the demanding state.
CONCLUSION
Although not originally used to review decisions of substantive law,
appeal in the nature of certiorari has been expanded to fulfil this function
in some instances because of the number and importance of the adminis-
trative decisions which the appellate courts could only reach in this manner.
This expansion was accomplished in decisions reviewing election cases,
and has resulted in the creation in such cases of a certiorari as broad as
the equity appeal. In spite of the fact that this broad review was allowed
only because of the quasi-equitable nature of election cases, the courts
have used it to review at least questions of law in other fields. The result
has been great uncertainty as to the scope of certiorari under various
circumstances.
The liquor license cases illustrate an attempt by the courts to recon-
cile their conflicting decisions on the subject by applying narrow certiorari
to decisions under statutes forbidding appeal, and broad certiorari to
decisions under statutes silent on the subject. Although this distinction
by reference to statutes does not explain the election cases, the legislature
has apparently affirmed it in part by providing for an appeal from lower
court decisions under the Administrative Agency Law, since that law
covers only adjudications under statutes silent on the subject of appeal.
The crux of the problem, however, is the complete lack of cooperation
between legislature and courts. Although it is common knowledge that
the courts have disregarded the legislature's attempt by the Act of 1889
to standardize all review proceedings, the legislature in subsequent statutes
continues to speak as if such proceedings had in fact been standardized,
and consisted of the one form-appeal. Meantime the courts continue to
distinguish between the various forms of appeal, and to set the scope of
certiorari apparently in accordance with the demands of justice in the
individual case. The treatment of the appeal provided by the Adminis-
trative Agency Law is further evidence of this. Prior to the law broad
certiorari was allowed. In apparent affirmation of the practice, the law
provides for "appeal . . . as in other cases." Thus left without specific
description of the type and scope of the appellate proceeding allowed,
the Supreme Court has so far rendered two inconsistent opinions on the
question, 74 thus indicating that, contrary to the concern for legislative
direction shown in the liquor cases, it will continue to tailor the scope of
its review to fit the needs of the situation. The habeas corpus cases reveal
this same tendency.
73. It is worth noting, however, that the Governor has an opportunity to refuse
extradition, and that such policy decisions might well be left up to him. See also note
69 supra.
74. See note 4 stpra.
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Although there is no doubt that the appellate courts have done sub-
stantial justice to the litigants in each case in handling this question of
the scope of certiorari, they have produced such confusion on the subject
that sure predictability of the scope of future proceedings is not possible.
The balance between justice to the parties in an individual case and cer-
tainty in the law has been tipped so far that certainty is out of sight. Such
should not be the case since justice itself is defeated when the law is so
uncertain that two different litigants in the same legal position before the
court are accorded different rights. A comprehensive and specific legis-
lative overhauling of appellate procedure in Pennsylvania is needed. In
its absence, consistent and explicit statements by the courts as to the
extent of review allowed by certiorari under various circumstances would
be of great assistance to the practitioner.
F.K.T.
